
                        UNIX Security Checklist v2.0
*****
***** This is an annotated version of CERT's checklist which
***** specificies which of the checks are implemented automatically
***** by the Tiger security tool
*****
     _________________________________________________________________

Introduction

   This document has been published jointly by The Australian Computer
   Emergency Response Team (AusCERT) and the CERTŪ Coordination Center
   (CERT/CC) and details steps to improve the security of Unix Operating
   Systems. We encourage system administrators to review all sections of
   this document and if appropriate modify their systems accordingly to
   fix potential weaknesses.

   The most current version of this document is available from:

     http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Auscert_info/papers.html

   While this document details security procedures for UNIX based
   systems, it should not be used as a tool for recovering from a system
   compromise. For information regarding recovering from a system we
   encourage you to review the "Steps for Recovering from a UNIX or NT
   System Compromise" document, available from:

     http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Auscert_info/Papers/win-UNIX-
     system_compromise.html

   It is our intention to continue to update this checklist. Any comments
   should be directed via email to auscert@auscert.org.au and
   cert@cert.org. Before using this document, ensure you have the latest
   version. New versions of this checklist will be placed in the same
   area and should be checked for periodically.

   If possible, apply this checklist to a system before attaching it to a
   network. In addition, we recommend that you use the checklist on a
   regular basis as well as after you install any patches or new versions
   of the operating system, with consideration given to the
   appropriateness of each action to your particular situation.
     _________________________________________________________________

                                 Disclaimer

   AusCERT and CERT/CC advise that this information is provided without
   warranty - sites should ensure that actions and procedures taken from
   information in this document are verified and in accordance with
   security policies that are in place within their organisation. Listing
   of an application program or tool within this document does not
   constitute endorsement by AusCERT, The University of Queensland, or
   CERT/CC.
     _________________________________________________________________

Table of Contents:

Section I. The First Step

     * 1.0 Patches

Section II. The Basic Operating System

     * 2.0 Network Services
     * 3.0 Network Administration
     * 4.0 File System Security
     * 5.0 Account Security
     * 6.0 System Monitoring

Section III. Major Services

     * 7.0 Name Service
     * 8.0 Electronic Mail
     * 9.0 Web Security
     * 10.0 FTP: ftpd and anonymous ftp
     * 11.0 File Services
     * 12.0 X Window System

Section IV. Specific Operating Systems

     * 13.0 BSD-derived Operating Systems
     * 14.0 Linux Distributions
     * 15.0 Solaris
     * 16.0 IRIX
     * 17.0 HP-UX
     * 18.0 Digital/Compaq Tru64 Unix
     * 19.0 AIX

Section V. Appendixes

     * A. Useful Security Tools
     * B. References
     * C. List of Commands by UNIX Flavour
     * D. Abbreviated Checklist
     * E. Unix Security Checklist - The Essentials
     _________________________________________________________________

Section I. The First Step

1.0 Patches
            ____________________________________________________

     * Retrieve the latest patch list for your specific operating system,
       as well as any applications (i.e. web server, DNS, etc...) from
       the appropriate vendors. Install any security patches not yet
       installed that are recommended for your system. Be aware that some
       patches may re-enable default configurations. For this reason, it
       is important to go through this checklist AFTER installing ANY new
       patches or software packages.
     * Details on obtaining patches for particular operating systems may
       be found in Section IV.
     * Verify the digital signature of any signed files. Encryption tools
       like PGP and GnuPG may be used to sign files and to verify those
       signatures. Refer to A.2.10 for PGP and GnuPG access information.
     * If a digital signature is not supplied but an MD5 checksum is,
       then verify the checksum information to confirm that you have
       retrieved a valid copy. Refer to A.2.6 for information on
       obtaining MD5 tools.
     * If only a generic sum(1) checksum is provided, then check that. Be
       aware that the sum(1) checksum will only detect modifications
       during transfer (e.g. download) and won't detect malicious changes
       prior to download. For this reason, it is always preferable to
       verify files with either PGP/GnuPG or MD5.
     * Keep your software and patches up to date. Notifications of patch
       releases are generally done via mailing lists.
          + Subscribe to the vendor's security update mailing list for
            your particular operating system. Refer to Section IV for
            individual operating system vendors.
          + Subscribe to security advisory mailing lists from your local
            incident response team (if you have one). These mailing lists
            are typically low volume and provide invaluable information
            for system and security administrators. Refer to B.2.3 for
            information on subscribing to related mailing lists.

***** This is not yet thoroughly checked by Tiger for all OS supported.
***** There is a check_patches script for both Linux and SunOS (5.8) which
***** have the issue of were to download the patch information from 
***** (in the Linux script it is provided with Tiger and in the SunOS
***** script it needs to be downloaded by the administrator from sunsolve.com)
     _________________________________________________________________

Section II. The Basic Operating System

2.0 Network Services

     * 2.1 /etc/inetd.conf
     * 2.2 tcp_wrapper
     * 2.3 fingerd
     * 2.4 "r" Commands
     * 2.5 /etc/hosts.equiv
     * 2.6 $HOME/.rhosts
     * 2.7 /etc/netgroup
     * 2.8 /etc/services
     * 2.9 /etc/hosts.lpd
     * 2.10 /etc/login.access
     * 2.11 /etc/login.conf
     * 2.12 /etc/login.defs
     * 2.13 PAM
     * 2.14 cron
     * 2.15 Secure Terminals
     * 2.16 RPC
          + 2.16.1 portmapper/rpcbind
     * 2.17 Trivial FTP (tftp)
     * 2.18 Majordomo
     * 2.19 UUCP
     * 2.20 REXD
            ____________________________________________________

   2.1 /etc/inetd.conf
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.
**** Done in the check_inetd script and also by check_perms
     * ENSURE that the owner is root.
**** Done in the check_inetd script and also by check_perms
     * DO disable any services which you do not require.
**** Done in the check_inetd script
          + To do this we suggest that you comment out ALL services by
            placing a "#" at the beginning of each line. Even seemingly
            innocuous services such as echo and chargen may be used in a
            DoS attack.
          + Enable the ones you NEED by removing the "#" from the
            beginning of the line. In particular, it is best to avoid "r"
            commands (e.g. rsh, rlogin) and tftp, as they have been major
            sources of insecurities.
          + For changes to take effect, you need to restart the inetd
            process. Do this by issuing the commands in C.1. For some
            systems (including AIX), these commands are not sufficient.
            Refer to vendor documentation for more information.
          + Verify that you have disabled any unnecessary startup
            scripts. This may be done by removing the executable bit, or
            renaming the files so they do not start with K or S under
            /etc/init.d or startup script directory for your system. See
            your vendor's documentation for specific details.
**** Listening servers are checked for by the check_listeningprocs script.
**** TODO: This is not checked for directly (i.e. rc.d scripts are not 
**** checked to determine if there are systems enabled that should not be there)
     * DO use tcp_wrappers to provide greater access and logging on any
       enabled network services (see 2.2).
**** check_tcpd determines which inetd services are run through tcp wrappers
     * DO enable access controls and logging for inetd if your version
       supports it.
**** TODO: not done, preliminary version in check_network
**** (Note: Linux's inetd does not have logging nor access control)
     * CONSIDER alternatives to inetd. Xinetd is claimed to have enhanced
       access control and logging capabilities as well as resistance to
       DoS attacks. It is included in the Red Hat Linux 7 distribution
       and the source code is available for other systems from:
     http://www.xinetd.org/
**** There are some checks in the check_xinetd script (which should be 
**** improved)

   2.2 tcp_wrapper
     * ENSURE that you are using this package as it allows you to monitor
       and filter incoming requests for common network services.
**** Checked by check_tcpd, notice it also checks the file permissions of
**** hosts.allow and hosts.deny which are not included in the checklist.
     * See A.1.13 for instructions to obtain tcp_wrapper.
     * Customise and install it for your system.
     * Enable PARANOID mode.
**** TODO: not done yet. This could be done in hosts.allow/deny 
     * CONSIDER running with the RFC931 (ident) option.
**** TODO: not done yet
     * Explicitly list trusted hosts which are allowed access to services
       on your machine in /etc/hosts.allow.
**** TODO: not done yet
     * Deny all other hosts by putting all:all:deny in /etc/hosts.allow.
       Please note that the rules in this file work on a "First match
       wins" basis, so be sure to allow any required hosts/services
       before you deny all other connections.
**** TODO: not done yet
     * Put all:all in /etc/hosts.deny to protect services that still use
       this file.
**** TODO: not done yet
     * DO wrap all TCP services that you have enabled in /etc/inetd.conf.
**** Checked by check_tcpd
**** Note: but compares against the default system configuration
     * CONSIDER wrapping any UDP services you have enabled. If you wrap
       them, then you will need to enable the nowait option in the
       /etc/inetd.conf file.
**** Checked by check_tcpd
**** Note: but compares against the default system configuration

   2.3 fingerd
**** Done in check_inetd
     * CONSIDER disabling the finger service if it is not considered
       essential.
     * ENSURE that you have an up-to-date version of fingerd. Do not use
       a version of fingerd that is older than 16 October, 2000. Refer to
       the AusCERT ESB:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/ESB/ESB-2000.286
     * Fingerd can provide a would-be intruder with a lot of information
       about your host. CONSIDER the finger information you provide and
       think about reducing the content by disabling finger or by
       replacing it with a version that only offers restricted
       information. [NOTE: Other services such as rusers and netstat may
       give out similar information.]
     * DO NOT enable reverse finger as this can create a 'finger war' DoS
       loop with other systems also configured for reverse finger.
     * ENSURE that you configure fingerd to deny indirect finger
       requests. (i.e. finger user@some_host@your_host)

   2.4 "r" Commands
     * If you don't NEED to use the "r" commands (e.g. rlogin, rsh,
       rcp)...
**** Done in check_inetd (for inetd servers)
          + DO disable all "r" commands unless specifically required, as
            they may increase your risk of password exposure in network
            sniffer attacks. Also, "r" commands have been a regular
            source of insecurities and attacks. Disabling them is by far
            the lesser of the two evils (Refer to 2.1).
     * If you must run the "r" commands...
**** Done in check_inetd (for inetd servers)
          + CONSIDER replacing the "r" command functionality with more
            secure utilities, for example ssh and scp. Ssh is a vastly
            superior program over rsh, telnet, etc... because it encrypts
            your password as well as all data transmitted in the session.
            Refer to A.2.13 for information on where you can obtain ssh.
          + DO NOT allow the use of $HOME/.rhosts (See 2.6).
**** Done in check_rhosts
          + DO use more secure versions of the "r" commands for cases
            where there is a specific need. Wietse Venema's logdaemon
            package contains a more secure version of the "r" command
            daemons. These versions can be configured to consult only
            /etc/hosts.equiv and not $HOME/.rhosts. There is also an
            option to disable the use of wildcards ('+'). Refer to A.2.4
            for access information for the logdaemon package.
**** TODO: not done, but check_rhosts analyses for wildcards
          + DO filter ports 512, 513, and 514 (TCP) at your network
            border router to prevent access to them by people outside of
            your network. To limit access by people inside your network,
            these commands must either be disabled completely or
            restricted to certain hosts only by the configuration of the
            hosts.allow and hosts.deny files.
**** TODO: not done, but could be done in hosts.allow and hosts.deny.

   2.5 /etc/hosts.equiv
     * It is recommended that the following actions be taken whether or
       not the "r" commands are in use on your system.
          + CHECK if the file /etc/hosts.equiv is required. If you are
            running "r" commands, this file allows other hosts to be
            trusted by your system. Programs such as rlogin can then be
            used to log on to the same account name on your machine from
            a trusted machine without supplying a password. If you are
            not running "r" commands or you do not wish to explicitly
            trust other systems, you should have no use for this file and
            it should be removed or emptied. Creating /etc/hosts.equiv as
            a zero-length file enables it to be monitored by utilities
            such as Tripwire (A.1.15) for modification. If it does not
            exist or is empty, it cannot cause you any problems if any of
            the "r" commands are accidentally re-enabled.
     * If you must use a /etc/hosts.equiv file
          + ENSURE that you keep only a small number of TRUSTED hosts
            listed.
          + DO use netgroups for easier management if you run NIS (also
            known as YP) or NIS+.
          + DO only trust hosts within your domain or under your
            management.
          + ENSURE that your /etc/host.conf (or equivalent) is set to the
            order hosts, bind. Specify in /etc/hosts.equiv the hosts for
            which you wish to allow "r" commands.
          + ENSURE that you use fully qualified hostnames (i.e.
            hostname.domainname.au).
          + DO specify usernames in /etc/hosts.equiv if access is only
            required for specific users.
          + ENSURE that you do NOT have a '+' entry by itself anywhere in
            the file as this may allow users access to the system.
**** TODO: This is done by check_perms, but needs to be revised for 
**** every configuration.
          + ENSURE that the permissions are set to 600.
          + ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
          + CHECK it again after each patch or operating system
            installation.

   2.6 $HOME/.rhosts
     * It is recommended that the following action be taken whether or
       not the "r" commands are in use on your system.
          + ENSURE that no user has a .rhosts file in their home
            directory. These files pose a greater security risk than
            /etc/hosts.equiv, as one can be created by each user. There
            are some genuine needs for these files, (e.g. running
            unattended backups over a network) so consider each one on a
            case-by-case basis.
**** Done in check_rhosts
          + DO use cron to periodically check for, report the contents of
            and delete (or clear) $HOME/.rhosts files. Users should be
            made aware that you regularly perform this type of audit, as
            directed by your internal policy.
**** Done by Tiger in it's cron.d configuration
     * If you must have such a file:
          + ENSURE that you do NOT have the symbol "-" as the first
            character in this file, or the symbol "+" on any line, as
            these may allow users access to the system.
**** Done in check_rhosts
          + ENSURE that the permissions are set to 600.
**** Done in check_rhosts
          + ENSURE that you use fully qualified hostnames (i.e.
            hostname.domainname.au).
**** TODO: not done.
          + ENSURE that your /etc/host.conf (or equivalent) is set to the
            order hosts, bind and specify in it the hosts for which you
            wish to allow "r" commands.
**** TODO: not done.
          + ENSURE that the owner of the file is the account's owner.
**** Done in check_rhosts
          + ENSURE that usernames are specified.
**** TODO: check if it's done.
          + ENSURE that usage of netgroups within .rhosts does not allow
            unintended access to this account. This is best achieved by
            specifying individual users and hosts you want to have
            access.
**** TODO: check if it's done.
          + REMEMBER that you can also use logdaemon to restrict the use
            of $HOME/.rhosts (Refer to A.2.4).

   2.7 /etc/netgroup
**** TODO: not done.
     * If you require the functionality of NIS, CONSIDER using NIS+ due
       to the inherent insecurity of NIS (YP).
     * If you are using NIS (YP) or NIS+, DO define each netgroup to
       contain only usernames or only hostnames. All utilities parse
       /etc/netgroup for either hosts or usernames, but never both. Using
       separate netgroups makes it easier to remember the function of
       each netgroup. The added time required to administer these extra
       netgroups is a small cost to ensure that strange permission
       combinations have not left your machine in an insecure state.
       Refer to the manual pages for more information.
**** TODO: This is done by check_perms, but needs to be revised for 
**** every configuration.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.

   2.8 /etc/services
**** TODO: This is done by check_perms, but needs to be revised for 
**** every configuration.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 644.
     * ENSURE that the owner is root.

   2.9 /etc/hosts.lpd
**** TODO: This is done by check_perms, but needs to be revised for 
**** every configuration.
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.
**** TODO: not done.
     * ENSURE that you use fully qualified hostnames (i.e.
       hostname.domainname.au).
     * CONSIDER preventing lpd from listening to the network unless
       necessary. It may be possible to accomplish this with command-line
       arguments - refer to your vendor documentation or man pages.
     * DO filter the printer port (515/tcp) on your routers. Many of the
       recent worms exploit buffer overflows in lpd.

   2.10 /etc/login.access
**** TODO: not done yet
**** Note: Does not apply to Linux but Linux supports Pam configuration.
     * CONSIDER using this file as it provides finer control over user
       access. Please refer to your vendor documentation for more
       details. [NOTE: This file may not exist on all versions of Unix.]
     * CONSIDER modifying this file to disallow remote access to
       privileged accounts. An example to disallow non-local logins to
       privileged accounts (group wheel):

     -:wheel:ALL EXCEPT LOCAL
**** TODO: not done yet, could be done in check_perms, implemented 
**** in the mklst script
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.
     * ENSURE that you use fully qualified hostnames or domains (i.e.
       hostname.domainname.au or .domainname.au)

   2.11 /etc/login.conf
**** TODO: not done yet. 
**** Note: Does not apply to Linux.
     * This file is used by default on some BSD systems, users that are
       not created with a specified class are in the 'default' class.
     * DO use this file to set up user environment and to set policy and
       accounting restrictions.
**** TODO: not done yet, could be done in check_perms, implemented 
**** in the mklst script
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.
     * CONSIDER creating specific user classes to enable finer control of
       users.

   2.12 /etc/login.defs
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * This file is used by some Linux systems.
     * DO use this file to provide centralised control over user
       environment settings.
**** TODO: not done yet, could be done in check_perms, implemented 
**** in the mklst script
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are set to 600.

   2.13 PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules)
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * Be aware that PAM may be operational by default on your system.
     * To find out if a given executable uses PAM, execute the command
       ldd [path to executable file]. For example, the resulting output
       for /usr/bin/login on a FreeBSD 4.x system:
    /usr/bin/login:
    libutil.so.3 => /usr/lib/libutil.so.3 (0x28068000)
    libcrypt.so.2 => /usr/lib/libcrypt.so.2 (0x28072000)
    libpam.so.1 => /usr/lib/libpam.so.1 (0x28074000)
    libc.so.4 => /usr/lib/libc.so.4 (0x2807d000)
               Note the libpam.so.1, this is a PAM module.
     * Depending on the system, PAM may be configured with the file
       /etc/pam.conf or with individual configuration files in
       /etc/pam.d/.
     * ENSURE that PAM is configured to be secure by default - a
       misconfigured service may result in an attempt to authenticate
       using a less secure mechanism, which should be always denied.
     * CONSIDER disabling unneeded services under PAM, either by
       renaming/deleting the individual files or by editing
       /etc/pam.conf.
     * More information about PAM is available from:

     http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
     http://www.sun.com/solaris/pam/

   2.14 cron
**** Done by check_cron
     * ENSURE that the permissions for root's crontab are set to 600.
     * ENSURE that the owner is set to root.
     * CONSIDER disallowing cron for regular users.

   2.15 Secure terminals
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * This file may be called /etc/ttys, /etc/default/login,
       /etc/security or /etc/securetty depending on the operating system.
       See the manual pages for file format and usage information.
**** TODO: not done yet, could be done in check_perms, implemented 
**** in the mklst script
     * ENSURE that this file is owned by root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions on this file are 600.
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO NOT allow remote root access.
     * ENSURE that the secure option is removed from all local entries
       that don't need root login capabilities. The secure option should
       be removed from console if you do not want users to be able to
       reboot in single user mode. [NOTE: This does not affect usability
       of the su(1) command.]

   2.16 RPC
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * ENSURE that your system is not running a vulnerable rpc.statd.
       Refer to the AusCERT ESB:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/ESB/ESB-2000.222
     * DO use secure RPC for the running services where possible.
     * DO filter port 111 (tcp) on your router to disable access to RPC
       services from outside your network.
     * 2.16.1 portmapper/rpcbind
          + DON'T enable the portmap service unless necessary. A machine
            that doesn't use the sunrpc services (i.e. NFS or NIS)
            doesn't need portmap.
          + DO disable any non-required services that are registered with
            the portmapper on start up. See C.2 for a command to help
            check for registered services.
          + CONSIDER replacing portmapper/rpcbind with a more secure
            version which can restrict local forwarding of rpc calls
            (indirect calls) and provides enhanced logging. See A.2.11
            for more info.

   2.17 Trivial FTP (tftp)
**** Done by check_inetd
     * DO disable tftp if not needed, comment it out from the file
       /etc/inetd.conf and restart the inetd process. (Refer to C.1)
     * If required, DO create a separate partition to store the files to
       be served by tftp and limit the tftp daemon to the directory where
       this partition is mounted.
     * ENSURE that the files in the tftp area are not writable.

   2.18 Majordomo
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * ENSURE that you are using the latest version of Majordomo. It is
       available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.greatcircle.com/pub/majordomo/
       or via HTTP from:

     http://www.greatcircle.com/mojordomo/

   2.19 UUCP
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO disable the uucp account, including it's login shell, if it is
       not used at your site. Remember, uucp may be shipped in a
       dangerous state.
**** Done in check_rhosts
     * REMOVE any .rhosts file at the uucp home directory.
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * ENSURE that the file L.cmds is owned by root.
**** Done by find_files (but not specific to uucp)
     * ENSURE that no uucp owned files or directories are world writable.
     * ENSURE that you have assigned a different uucp login for each site
       that needs uucp access to your machine.
     * ENSURE that you have limited the number of commands that each uucp
       login can execute to a bare minimum.
     * CONSIDER deleting the whole uucp subsystem if it is not required.
     * ENSURE there are no vendor-supplied uucp or root crontab entries.

   2.20 REXD
**** Done by check_inetd
     * DO disable this service. Comment this out in the inetd.conf file.
       Refer to 2.1 for details on how to do this. rexd servers have
       little or no security in their design or implementation. Intruders
       can exploit this service to execute commands as any user.

**** TODO: it does not recommend removing udp versions of echo/chargen
**** (maybe even TCP?) since they could be spoofed and used for DoS attacks
     _________________________________________________________________

3.0 Networking Administration

     * 3.1 Packet Filtering
     * 3.2 Denial of Service Attacks
     * 3.3 Encryption and Strong Authentication
            ____________________________________________________

   3.1 Packet Filtering
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO use packet filtering at network or administrative borders to
       enforce security policies by restricting network traffic entering
       and leaving your domain.
     * DO use multi-layer firewalls, such as a host-based firewall in
       addition to network packet filtering.
     * DO use protocol type, destination address, and destination port
       information to construct packet filters to enforce security
       policies for inbound traffic.
     * ENSURE that ONLY packets for those services which require access
       across your network or administrative border are allowed to enter
       and leave your domain.
     * In particular, if external traffic to and from the following
       services is not required at your site, use packet filters to block
       traffic to and from the following services. Inbound filters should
       block based on protocol type and destination port. Outbound
       filters should block based on protocol type and source port.
    NAME       PORT/PROTOCOL    NAME              PORT/PROTOCOL

    tcpmux        1/tcp         netbios-ns         137/udp
    echo          7/tcp         netbios-dgm        138/tcp
    echo          7/udp         netbios-dgm        138/udp
    discard       9/tcp         netbios-ssn        139/tcp
    discard       9/udp         netbios-ssn        139/udp
    systat       11/tcp         imap               143/tcp
    daytime      13/tcp         snmp               161/udp
    daytime      13/udp         snmp-trap          162/udp
    netstat      15/tcp         xdmcp              177/udp
    chargen      19/tcp         exec               512/tcp
    chargen      19/udp         biff               512/udp
    ftp          21/tcp         login              513/tcp
    ssh          22/tcp         who                513/udp
    telnet       23/tcp         shell              514/tcp
    smtp         25/tcp         syslog             514/udp
    domain (DNS) 53/tcp         printer            515/tcp
    domain (DNS) 53/udp         talk               517/udp
    bootps       67/tcp         ntalk              518/udp
    bootps       67/udp         route              520/udp
    bootpc       68/tcp         klogind            543/tcp
    bootpc       68/udp         socks             1080/tcp
    tftp         69/udp         nfs               2049/tcp
    finger       79/tcp         nfs               2049/udp
    http         80/tcp         X11     6000 to 6000+n/tcp
    pop2        109/tcp
    pop3        110/tcp         (n = maximum number of X servers)
    sunrpc      111/tcp
    netbios-ns  137/tcp

             * ENSURE that ONLY hosts in your domain exchanging
       legitimate traffic with external hosts are allowed to send and
       receive packets for required services.
     * For inbound filters, use protocol type, destination address, and
       destination port. For outbound filters, use protocol type, source
       address, and source port.
     * Hosts not required to route TCP/IP packets should have this
       facility disabled. An example of disabling this for a Linux
       system:

     echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
     * Filtering can be difficult to implement correctly. For more
       information on packet filtering and firewalls, please see:

     Firewalls and Internet Security B.1.6
     Building Internet Firewalls B.1.7
     Deploying Firewalls

     http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/modules/m08.html

   3.2 Denial of Service Attacks
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO take steps to prevent your site being used to launch denial of
       service attacks against other Internet sites.
     * DO disable IP directed broadcasts for subnetworks within your
       domain to prevent your network from being an intermediary in
       certain types of denial of service attacks.
     * For more information about IP directed broadcast and associated
       denial of service attacks, see:

     AusCERT Alert AL-98.01 - multiscan ('mscan') Tool
     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-98.01.mscan
     CERT/CC Advisory CA-1998-01 - Smurf IP Denial-of-Service Attacks
     http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-01.html
     AusCERT Alert AL-1999.001 - "sscan" scanning tool
     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-1999.001.sscan
     RFC2644/BCP34 - Changing the Default for Directed Broadcasts in
     Routers
     http://rfc.net/rfc2644.html
     UNIX IP Stack Tuning Guide v2.7 (Rob Thomas)
     http://www.cymru.com/~robt/Docs/Articles/ip-stack-tuning.html
     * DO use packet filters to allow ONLY packets with a legitimate
       source IP address to originate (or transit) your network. Many
       denial of service attacks depend on the ability for an intruder to
       generate false, or spoofed, source IP addresses in packets. For
       more information on anti-spoofing filters, see:

     CERT/CC Advisory CA-1998-01 - Smurf IP Denial of Service Attacks
     http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-01.html

     RFC2827/BCP38 - Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of
     Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing
     http://rfc.net/rfc2827.html
     * DO use packet filters to block incoming packets with source IP
       addresses that are in well-known reserved address space. The
       authoritative list of assigned and reserved address space can be
       found at:

     http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space
       More information about address space allocated to private use can
       be found at:

     RFC1918 - Address Allocation for Private Internets
     http://rfc.net/rfc1918.html
     * DO take steps to prepare for responding to network-based denial of
       service attacks, particularly attacks based on distributed
       intruder tools.

     Results of the Distributed-Systems Intruder Tools Workshop:
     http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop-final.html

   3.3 Encryption and Strong Authentication
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO use encryption technologies when administrating hosts and
       network equipment in your domain to prevent administrator
       passwords and other sensitive information from crossing your
       network in clear-text. Information on various methods is available
       from:

     http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/encryption/encryption_list.htm
     * DO use strong authentication when accessing hosts in your domain
       to reduce the risk of a security breach due to false credentials.
     * The SSH protocol employs public key cryptography and provides both
       encryption and strong authentication. Refer to A.2.13 for
       information on where you can obtain ssh.
     _________________________________________________________________

4.0 File system security

     * 4.1 General
     * 4.2 Startup and Shutdown Scripts
     * 4.3 External File Dystems/Devices
     * 4.4 File Permissions 
     * 4.5 Files Run by root
     * 4.6 Bin Ownership
     * 4.7 Tiger
     * 4.8 Tripwire
     * 4.9 The Coroner's Toolkit
            ____________________________________________________

   4.1 General
     * DO consider using the EXINIT environment variable to disable .exrc
       file functionality. These files may inadvertently perform commands
       that may compromise the security of your system if you happen to
       start either vi(1) or ex(1) in a directory which contains such a
       file. See C.11 for example commands to find .exrc files.
**** This is done by check_exrc 
     * ENSURE that there are no .exrc files on your system that have no
       legitimate purpose.
**** TODO: Partially done by check_accounts
     * ENSURE that any .forward files in user home directories do not
       execute an unauthorised command or program. The mailer may be
       fooled into allowing a normal user privileged access. Authorised
       programs may be restricted through use of smrsh (8.1 Sendmail).
       See C.12 for example commands to find .forward files.
***** Partially done by check_path
     * ENSURE user or directories shared amongst users are not specified
       before system directories in executable search paths (allows
       installation of Trojan programs).
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO consider using mount options, such as nosuid, nodev and noexec
       for user home partitions, /var and /tmp in your /etc/fstab or
       vfstab file. (please refer to your specific operating system's
       documentation for the exact file and location)
     * DO consider setting filesystem limits. For example, by enabling
       quota support for individual users or by using the resource-limits
       PAM module.

   4.2 Startup and Shutdown Scripts
**** Done by check_umask
     * ENSURE that the default umask for all programs is 022.

   4.3 External File Systems/Devices
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * DO mount external file systems non-setuid and read-only where
       practical. For more information, refer to 11.1.

   4.4 File Permissions 
**** Done by check_logfiles
     * ENSURE that the permissions of /etc/utmp and /var/adm/wtmp are set
       to 644.
**** Done by check_perms
     * ENSURE that the permissions of /etc/motd and /etc/mtab are set to
       644.
**** Done by check_perms
     * ENSURE that the permissions of /etc/syslog.pid
       (/var/run/syslog.pid on some systems) are set to 644. [NOTE: This
       may be reset each time you restart syslog.]
**** Partially done in some checks
     * CONSIDER removing read access to system configuration files that
       users do not need to access, for example rc.* startup files and
       authentication files like /etc/hosts.allow.
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * ENSURE that logfiles (usually in /var/log/) are only writable by
       root.
     * CONSIDER using filesystem security features if your operating
       system supports them - system binaries may be made immutable, log
       files append-only.
**** Done by check_perms
     * ENSURE that the kernel (e.g., /vmunix) is owned by root, has group
       set to 0 (wheel on SunOS) and permissions set to 644.
**** Done by check_perms (but not strict)
     * ENSURE that /etc, /usr/etc, /bin, /usr/bin, /sbin, /usr/sbin, /tmp
       and /var/tmp are owned by root and that the sticky-bit is set on
       /tmp and on /var/tmp (see C.14) Refer to the AusCERT Advisory:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AA-95.07.Incorrect.Pe
     rmissions.on.tmp.may.allow.root.access
**** Done by find_files
     * ENSURE that there are no unexpected world writable files or
       directories on your system. See C.15 for example commands to find
       group and world writable files and directories.
**** Done by check_perms and also by find_files
     * ENSURE that files which have the SUID or SGID bit set, need to
       have it that way (see C.16). Remove this bit from programs that do
       not require elevated privileges to function successfully.
**** Done by check_umask
     * ENSURE the umask value for each user is set to something sensible
       like 027 or 077. (Refer to C.4 for a shell script to check this).
**** Done by check_devices
     * ENSURE all files in /dev are special files. Special files are
       identified with a letter (usually c for 'character' or b for
       'block') in the first position of the permissions bits. See C.17
       for a command to find files in /dev which are not special files or
       directories. [NOTE: Some systems have directories and a shell
       script in /dev which may be legitimate.] Please check the manual
       pages for more information.
**** TODO: not done yet. 
     * ENSURE that there are no unexpected special files outside /dev.
       See C.18 for a command to find any block special or character
       special files.

   4.5 Files Run by root

*** TODO: Note: this could be generically done by the find_files script
   We recommend that any script or binary to be executed by root should
   be owned by root and should not be world or group writable.
   Additionally, this file should only be located in a directory for
   which every parent directory is owned by root and is not group or
   world writable.
**** Partially done by check_embed
     * CHECK the contents of the following files for the root account.
       Any programs or scripts referenced in these files should meet the
       above requirements:
          + ~/.login, ~/.profile and similar login initialisation files
          + ~/.exrc and similar program initialisation files
          + ~/.logout and similar session cleanup files
          + crontab and at entries
          + files on NFS partitions
          + /etc/rc* and similar system startup and shutdown files
     * If any programs or scripts referenced in these files source
       further programs or scripts they also need to be verified.

   4.6 Bin Ownership

   Many systems ship files and directories owned by bin (or sys). This
   varies from system to system and may have serious security
   implications.
**** NOT done (does not make any changes)
     * CHANGE all non-setuid files and all non-setgid files and
       directories that are world readable but not world or group
       writable and that are owned by bin to ownership of root, with
       group id 0. - Please note that under Solaris 2.x changing
       ownership of system files can cause warning messages during
       installation of patches and system packages. One utility available
       to help Solaris administrators avoid this problem is fix-modes
       (A.2.3). Anything else should be verified with the vendor.

   4.7 Tiger
**** Obviously this is ok
**** TODO: should notify the people at CERT to update this info
     * DO run Tiger or a similar program that can automatically parse log
       files or check for vulnerable files. Many of the checks in this
       section can be automated by using this type of program.
     * To obtain this program, see A.1.14

   4.8 Tripwire
**** Done, tiger runs tripwire and could be configured for the notes below
     * Tripwire is a file integrity checker, it is used for intrusion
       detection by monitoring for file-system changes.
     * DO run the statically linked binary.
     * DO store the binary, the database and the configuration file on
       hardware write-protected media.
     * To obtain this program, see A.1.15

   4.9 The Coroner's Toolkit
**** Not done, but check_finddeleted does some of this
     * A forensic analysis tool, written by Wietse Venema and Dan Farmer.
       It may be used to statically examine storage devices from a
       compromised system, or to monitor a running system for unusual
       files or processes.
     * DO run this tool for compromise recovery and analysis on a
       non-networked machine.
     * To obtain this program, see A.1.8
     _________________________________________________________________

5.0 Account Security

     * 5.1 Policy
     * 5.2 Administration
     * 5.3 Special Accounts
     * 5.4 root Account
     * 5.5 .netrc Files
     * 5.6 GCOS Field
     * 5.7 Authentication
          + 5.7.1 NIS, NIS+ and /etc/passwd Entries
          + 5.7.2 Password Shadowing 
          + 5.7.3 One-Time-Passwords
          + 5.7.4 LDAP
            ____________________________________________________

   5.1 Policy
**** Note: this is done by the system but some could be automated
     * ENSURE that you have a password policy for your site. See the
       AusCERT Advisory:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AA-93.04.Password.Pol
     icy.Guidelines
       for guidelines on developing password policies.
     * ENSURE you have a User Registration Form for each user on each
       system. Make sure that this form includes a section that the
       intending applicant signs, stating that they have read your
       account usage policy and what the consequences are if they misuse
       their account.
     * DO use anlpasswd or a similar utility to proactively screen
       passwords as they are entered. This program runs a series of
       checks on passwords when they are set, which assists in avoiding
       poor passwords. It works with normal, shadow and NIS (or yp)
       password systems. (Refer to A.1.2 for how to obtain it)
**** TODO: Not done
     * DO apply and enforce password aging.
     * It is possible to implement both proactive password screening and
       aging with Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM). This facility
       provides for other forms of access control - consult the
       documentation if it is available for your system. Similar
       functionality is available in the /etc/login.defs file on some
       Linux systems.
**** Done through crack_run
     * CONSIDER checking passwords periodically with Crack or "John the
       Ripper" or other password cracking program. (Refer to A.2.2 for
       how to obtain these programs). Organisations may wish to
       incorporate this procedure into a published security policy.
**** TODO: Not done
     * DO implement the use of sudo in installations where multiple users
       require the ability to run processes as root. sudo allows for
       greater security by providing configurable limitations on the use
       of the root account. sudo will also log all attempts to use it via
       syslog or to a specified file. sudo is available from:

     http://www.courtesan.com/sudo/
     http://www.stikman.com/sudo/
     * CONSIDER implementing a Role Based Access Control mechanism such
       as RBAC which was developed by the National Institute of Standards
       and Technology (NIST). (Refer to A.2.12 for additional
       information)

   5.2 Administration
**** Done by check_accounts
     * ENSURE that you regularly audit your system for dormant accounts
       and disable any that have not been used for a specified period of
       time, in accordance with your site's security policy. Send out
       account renewal notices by post and delete any accounts of users
       that do not respond. [NOTE: Do not email renewal notices because
       any accounts being used illegitimately will reply as expected and
       hence will not be discovered.]
**** Done by check_passwd
     * ENSURE that all accounts have passwords. Check shadow, NIS, and
       NIS+ passwords too, if you have them. (i.e. the password field is
       not empty)
     * ENSURE that any user area is adequately backed up and archived.
**** TODO: not done, logcheck should do this
     * DO regularly monitor logs for successful and unsuccessful su(1)
       attempts.
**** TODO: not done, logcheck should do this
     * DO regularly check for repeated login failures.
**** TODO: not done, logcheck should do this
     * DO regularly check for LOGIN REFUSED messages.
     * Consider quotas on user accounts if you do not have them.
     * Consider requiring that users physically identify themselves
       before granting any requests regarding accounts (e.g., before
       creating a user account).

   5.3 Special Accounts
**** TODO: not done, this is not easy to automatically detect
     * ENSURE that there are no shared accounts other than root in
       accordance with site security policy. (i.e. more than one person
       should not know the password to an account)
     * Disable guest accounts. Better yet, do not create guest accounts!
       [NOTE: Some systems come preconfigured with guest accounts.]
     * DO use special groups (such as the "wheel" group under FreeBSD) to
       restrict which users can use su to become root.
**** TODO: This is not done, but vendor accounts could be checked for
**** based on a default username list.
     * DISABLE ALL default vendor accounts shipped with the Operating
       System. This should be checked after each upgrade or installation.
**** TODO: not done.
     * DO disable accounts that have no password which execute a command,
       for example "sync". Delete or change ownership of any files owned
       by these accounts. Ensure that these accounts do not have any cron
       or at jobs. It is best to remove these accounts entirely.
**** TODO: Done?
     * DO assign non-functional shells (such as /bin/false) to system
       accounts such as bin and daemon and to the sync account if it is
       not needed.
**** Done by check_ftpusers
     * DO put system accounts in the /etc/ftpusers file so they cannot
       use ftp. This should include, as a MINIMUM, the entries: root,
       bin, uucp, ingres, daemon, news, nobody and ALL vendor supplied
       accounts.

   5.4 root Account
**** TODO: This could not be easily done automatically (?)
     * DO restrict the number of people who know the root password. These
       should be the same users registered with groupid 0. Typically this
       is limited to at most 3 or 4 people.
**** TODO: this could be done by checking log files or using lastlog
     * DO NOT log in as root over the network, in accordance with site
       security policy.
     * DO su from user accounts rather than logging in as root. This
       provides greater accountability.
**** Done by check_rhosts
     * ENSURE root does not have a ~/.rhosts file.
**** Done in check_path
     * ENSURE "." is not in root's search path.
**** Done in check_path and check_embed
     * ENSURE root's login files do not source any other files not owned
       by root or which are group or world writable.
**** Done in check_path and check_embed
     * ENSURE root cron job files do not source any other files not owned
       by root or which are group or world writable.
**** Note: this is usage, cannot be monitored so easily
     * DO use absolute path names when root. (e.g. /bin/su, /bin/find,
       /bin/passwd.) This is to stop the possibility of root accidentally
       executing a trojan horse. To execute commands in the current
       directory, root should prefix the command with "./" (e.g.
       ./command)

   5.5 .netrc Files
**** Done in check_netrc together with more checks
     * DO NOT use .netrc files unless it is absolutely necessary.
     * If .netrc files must be used, DO NOT store password information in
       them.

   5.6 GCOS Field
**** TODO: not done
     * DO include information in the GCOS field of the password file
       which can be used to identify your site if the password file is
       stolen. e.g., joe:*:10:10:Joe Bloggs, Organisation
       X:/home/joe:/bin/sh

   5.7 Authentication
     * 5.7.1 NIS, NIS+ and /etc/passwd Entries
**** TODO: not checked for
          + DO NOT run NIS or NIS+ if you don't really need it.
          + If NIS functionality is required, DO use NIS+ if possible due
            to the additional security features provided.
**** TODO: Done in check_nisplus ?
          + ENSURE that the only machines that have a '+' entry in the
            /etc/passwd files are NIS (YP) clients; (i.e. NOT the NIS
            master server!) There appears to be conflicting documentation
            and implementations regarding the '+' entry format and so a
            generic solution is not available here. It would be best to
            consult your vendor's documentation. Some of the available
            documentation suggests placing a '*' in the password field,
            which is NOT consistent across all implementations of NIS. We
            recommend testing your systems on a case-by-case basis to see
            if they correctly implement the '*' in the password field.
            See C.10 for instructions.
**** TODO: not done yet
          + ENSURE that /etc/rc.local or the equivalent startup procedure
            is set up to start ypbind with the -s option. This may not be
            applicable on all systems. Check your documentation.
          + DO use secure RPC if available for your platform. This is
            also known as DES authentication and is a Sun Microsystems
            secure authentication mechanism for RPC. It depends on
            synchronised clocks and a shared DES key. See the manpage for
            nisaddcred for more info.
     * 5.7.2 Password Shadowing
**** TODO: not done yet
          + DO enable vendor supplied password shadowing or a third party
            product. Password shadowing restricts access to users'
            encrypted passwords.
**** TODO: not done yet
          + DO periodically audit your password and shadow password files
            for unauthorised additions or inconsistencies.
     * 5.7.3 One-Time Passwords
**** Note: not easy to audit automatically
          + CONSIDER using One-Time Passwords if users log into your
            machine via an insecure connection or protocol (such as
            telnet or ftp).
          + NEVER generate the master key or password lists over an
            insecure connection or protocol - these should be done
            locally on a secure (preferably not networked) machine.
          + ENSURE your users do not store password lists on or near
            their computer.
          + Minimise the number of passwords given to each user.
          + CONSIDER imposing a limit to the number of sequential failed
            logins. [NOTE: This has the possibilities of creating a DoS
            situation.]
          + A commonly used free version is Secure Key (S/KEY). This is
            implemented by default in the FreeBSD operating system. See
            A.2.8.
          + One-Time Passwords in Everything (OPIE) is another free
            implementation of non-replayable passwords. See A.2.8.
     * 5.7.4 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
          + LDAP is a protocol for accessing online directory services.
          + LDAP supports encryption and access control lists.
          + ENSURE that you provide access controls for services provided
            by an LDAP server.
          + An open-source implementation of LDAP is available from:

     http://www.openldap.org/
          + A historical reference page for LDAP is at:

     http://www.umich.edu/~dirsvcs/ldap/
     _________________________________________________________________

6.0 System Monitoring

     * 6.1 Account Security
     * 6.2 Log Files
     * 6.3 Network Security (syslog, etc)
            ____________________________________________________

   DISCLAIMER: We recommend you consult your organisation's security and
   privacy polices, as well as any laws for your area before implementing
                  any of the suggestions in this section.

   6.1 Account Security
     * DO regularly expire user passwords.
***** Done with crack_run
     * CONSIDER performing periodic checks of password security by
       running a cracking tool - for example, Crack or "John the Ripper"
       (See A.2.2) - against your password file.
***** TODO: Not checked
     * CONSIDER enabling auditing capabilities if available for your
       system - Solaris for example has a C2 auditing facility.
***** Done with check_runprocs but could be improved
     * DO actively monitor processes on your machines - tools are
       available that make it possible to do this remotely, like Big
       Brother (See A.1.3)
***** TODO: Not checked
     * DO run process accounting.
***** TODO: Not checked
     * CONSIDER logging all login attempts, both successful and
       unsuccessful.
     * DO examine accounting logfiles for activity, for example for su
       attempts.
     * CONSIDER disabling accounts after a number of failed login
       attempts. [NOTE: This has the possibilities of creating a DoS
       situation.]

   6.2 Log Files
**** TODO: Tell CERT to recommend logcheck
     * DO make use of facilities provided with your operating system to
       assist with disseminating log files e.g. FreeBSD emails a summary
       of important system and security information to root as part of
       its pre-configured crontab.
     * DO use a reliable mechanism for log rotation. This may include
       replacing an existing logging daemon with a more secure or
       full-featured one.
     * DO use network and system daemons that have more comprehensive
       logging features, such as logdaemon (See A.2.4) and tcp wrappers
       (See A.1.13).
     * DO make use of syslog facilities for network logging and log to
       more than one host if possible.
***** TODO: not done yet
     * CONSIDER protecting your logfiles with filesystem security if
       possible, for example FreeBSD and Linux support flags to make
       files append-only.

   6.3 Network Security
**** TODO: Tell CERT to recommend Nessus
     * DO use utilities to enable output profiling of log data, such as
       ISS (See A.3.1.3) or SAINT (See A.3.2.2).
     * CONSIDER implementing automated reporting facilities so that scans
       of your network are reported to the administrators of their
       originating domains.
***** Done with some of the integrity checking tools
     * DO check system files for modification regularly, using tools like
       Tripwire (See A.1.15).
     * DO keep a logbook of all sysadmin activity on each host on your
       network.
***** Done with check_listeningprocs
     * lsof (See A.2.5) is a tool for monitoring open system files and
       may be used to check for any suspicious activity.
     * DO thoroughly document any procedures associated with system
       modifications or upgrades.
     _________________________________________________________________

Section III. Major Services

7.0 Name Service

     * 7.1 BIND
     * 7.2 Alternatives
          + 7.2.1 DNS Tools by D. J. Bernstein
            ____________________________________________________

   7.1 BIND
***** TODO: not done yet
     * DO use the latest version of BIND available - there are known
       vulnerabilities in previous versions. Check for the latest
       releases at:

     http://www.isc.org/products/BIND
     * ENSURE that you turn off dynamic updates
     * CONSIDER applying the security practices detailed in the following
       documents:

     Secure BIND Template
     By Rob Thomas
     http://www.cymru.com/~robt/Docs/Articles/secure-bind-template.html

     Securing an Internet Name Server
     By Cricket Liu
     http://www.acmebw.com/resources/papers/securing.pdf
     Chroot-BIND HOWTO
     By Scott Wunsch
     http://www.linuxsecurity.com/docs/HOWTO/Chroot-BIND-HOWTO/Chroot-BI
     ND-HOWTO.html

   7.2 Alternatives
     * 7.2.1 DNS Tools by D. J. Bernstein
          + DNScache is a component of the djbdns collection of Domain
            Name System tools designed with security in mind.
          + The djbdns collection is available from:

     http://cr.yp.to/djbdns.html
     _________________________________________________________________

8.0 Electronic Mail

     * 8.1 Sendmail
          + 8.1.1 /etc/aliases
     * 8.2 Alternatives (qmail and postfix)
          + 8.2.1 qmail by D. J. Bernstein
          + 8.2.2 postfix by Wietse Venema (uses an alias database)
     * 8.3 POP/IMAP
            ____________________________________________________

   8.1 Sendmail
***** TODO: not done yet
     * DO use the latest version of Eric Allman's sendmail. The latest
       version is available via anonymous FTP from:

     http://www.sendmail.org/
       NOTE: If you don't already run the current version of sendmail,
       then it may take you some time to build, install, and configure
       the system to your needs. For example, other sendmail
       configuration files may not be compatible with the latest version
       of sendmail.
     * If you use a vendor version of sendmail, ENSURE that you have
       installed the latest patches as sendmail has been a source of
       several security vulnerabilities.
     * DO use smrsh if you require progmailer functionality to limit
       sendmail's scope of program execution to programs in smrsh
       configuration only. smrsh is a restricted shell utility that may
       be configured to execute a specific list of programs. smrsh is
       included with recent versions of sendmail.
     * If you do not require progmailer functionality then DO disable
       mail to programs by setting this field to /bin/false in the
       sendmail configuration file.
     * ENSURE sendmail is configured to deny relaying from unknown hosts.
       This helps to prevent your mail server from being used
       inappropriately. (e.g. for spam/UCE)
     * DO increase sendmail logging to a minimum log level of 9. This
       will help detect attempted exploitation of the sendmail
       vulnerabilities. See C.5 for example commands.
     * DO increase the level of logging provided by syslog. Enable a
       minimum level of "info" for mail messages to be logged to the
       console and/or the syslog file. See C.6 for example code and
       instructions.
     * CONSIDER disabling the daemon mode on client hosts. This will
       still allow clients to use sendmail for mail delivery. If this is
       implemented, CONSIDER adding sendmail -q to your crontab to ensure
       delayed messages are delivered.
     * REMEMBER that you will need to restart sendmail for any changes to
       take effect. If you are running a frozen configuration file
       (sendmail.fc), you will need to rebuild it before restarting
       sendmail (C.7). Note that sendmail v8.x no longer supports frozen
       configuration files.
**** Done with check_aliases
     * 8.1.1 /etc/aliases
          + ENSURE that all programs executable by an alias are owned by
            root, have permissions 755 and are stored in a directory
            specified by smrsh configuration e.g., /usr/libexec/sm.bin.
            Refer to your sendmail documentation for more details (8.1
            Sendmail).

   8.2 Alternatives (qmail and postfix)
     * 8.2.1 qmail by D. J. Bernstein
          + DO use the latest version of qmail. It is available at:

     http://cr.yp.to/qmail.html
          + Make sure you read all the documentation before you even
            begin to install and compile it.
          + It is recommended that qmail be used with tcpserver instead
            of inetd. It is available at:

     http://cr.yp.to/ucspi-tcp.html
          + qmail contains a sendmail 'dropin' to make conversion between
            the two transparent to users.
     * 8.2.2 postfix by Wietse Venema
          + DO use the latest version of postfix. To find your nearest
            anonymous FTP site for download, see:

     http://www.postfix.org/ftp-sites.html
          + ENSURE you have installed the relevant patches. See postfix's
            download page (above) for more information.
          + postfix's homepage can be found at:

     http://www.postfix.org
          + postfix has been designed to avoid common security problems
            such as shell access, set-uid, buffer overruns and DoS.
          + If you are thinking of using postfix instead of sendmail,
            read the documentation found on the postfix website and the
            mailing lists.

   8.3 POP/IMAP
***** TODO: not done yet
     * ENSURE that you have the latest version of your POP/IMAP software
       - there are known vulnerabilities in some previous and some
       obsolete POP/IMAP implementations. Ask your vendor for details if
       you are unsure.
     _________________________________________________________________

9.0 Web Security

     * 9.1 General Configuration
          + 9.1.1 chroot
          + 9.1.2 CGI Programming
          + 9.1.3 daemon non-root uid
          + 9.1.4 Command Interpreters
          + 9.1.5 SSL
          + 9.1.6 Additional Configuration Matters
     * 9.2 Freely Available Servers
          + 9.2.1 Apache
          + 9.2.2 publicfile
          + 9.2.3 WU-FTPD
     * 9.3 Client Configuration 
            ____________________________________________________

   9.1 General Configuration
***** TODO: not done yet
     * 9.1.1 chroot
          + DO consider running the web server as a chrooted process.
            Changing the root environment so that the http service runs
            in a properly restricted area can minimise damage resulting
            from a compromised web server.
          + CONSIDER placing static files onto a read-only media, such as
            a hardware write-protected hard disk or CD-ROM.
     * 9.1.2 CGI Programming
**** TODO: Done for Apache for check_apache but not all of the checks
          + ENSURE the server is configured to execute only those CGI
            scripts which reside in the CGI binary directory, e.g.,
            /cgi-bin. Set the ownership and permissions on this directory
            to 755 or 751. Consider monitoring changes to these scripts
            with such programs as Tripwire.
          + ENSURE that all default or example CGI scripts are backed up
            and removed if not needed or thoroughly tested for signs of
            bad programming practices (refer point below).
**** TODO: A simple audit of scripts could be done (at least recommending
**** some things like using -T or not using exec/eval/open in Perl...
          + DO audit CGI scripts for bad programming practices, for
            example, the use of:
               o within perl - eval, exec, open() to a pipe, backticks,
                 and the regular expression modifier /e all may fork a
                 process. These can potentially be subverted to allow an
                 attacker to run an arbitrary command
               o within C and C++ - popen() and system() are at risk in a
                 similar manner as perl above and can be subverted easily
                 to allow shell access.
          + DO test for untrustworthy user input. For example:
               o unexpected input values - may cause the script to
                 perform actions which were not intended by the author;
               o special characters - may allow unauthorised access. A
                 preferred alternative to checking for a list of
                 dangerous/special characters is to specify a list of
                 allowable characters;
               o unexpectedly large input - may cause buffer overflow or
                 inappropriate actions;
               o any other potential abuses.
          + DO use the tainting feature of Perl. CGI scripts written in
            Perl should be invoked with perl -T.
          + DO consider implementing CGI wrappers. Wrappers can be used
            to perform security checks on the script, e.g. - change the
            ownership of the CGI process, or use chroot as discussed
            above.
          + CONSIDER reading available documents on the Internet
            regarding secure programming. See B.2.5
     * 9.1.3 daemon non-root uid
**** TODO: check_apache should determine if it's run as root
          + ENSURE that you DO NOT run your web service as root. The UID
            and GID of the service should be changed, after it has been
            started, to a user and group that has no privileged access on
            the server. The most popular Unix web server, Apache, lowers
            its ownership level immediately after starting - it still
            must be invoked as root to allow it to bind to a privileged
            port. This avoids the risk of any scripts the web service
            executes running as root.
**** TODO: should be done in check_apache
          + DO set up script directories (e.g cgi-bin) to be owned by
            root and set permissions to 751. This prevents users from
            viewing contents of the directory whilst allowing the daemon
            to run the scripts within it. Additionally, if the server is
            compromised by sending unexpected input to a CGI script, the
            user that is running the server has no permission to edit or
            remove files from the script area.
          + DO set up the web server directory with root ownership.
          + ENSURE configuration, log, and binary files for the web
            server are owned by root and set permissions to 755.
     * 9.1.4 Command Interpreters
          + ENSURE that shells and command interpreters are removed from
            the web documents path.
          + CONSIDER running the web server machine solely for the
            purpose of being a web server (e.g. - do not run any other
            services such as mail, DNS etc) For such a server also remove
            all unnecessary accounts, unnecessary utilities, programs,
            compilers etc. and do not export any directories.
     * 9.1.5 SSL
          + DO consider using SSL (Secure Socket Layer) for encrypting
            any TCP/IP protocols in use. SSL can be used for server
            authentication, client authentication, and transmitting
            encrypted data.
          + DO consider using SHTTP (Secure HTTP).
     * 9.1.6 Additional Configuration Matters
**** Done in check_apache
          + DO consider configuring the web server to not allow automatic
            directory listing if an index.html file is not present in the
            directory.
**** Done in check_apache
          + DO consider configuring the web server to not follow symbolic
            links. This prevents a user with access to the web server's
            document tree from making other documents, outside the tree,
            available via symbolic links.
**** TODO: should be done in check_apache
          + DO consider preventing or limiting use of server-side
            includes. Some web servers can be configured to limit
            processing of server-side includes to specific directories.
**** TODO: should be done in check_apache
          + ENSURE that the directory of the documents served by the web
            server is not also available via anonymous FTP. Any
            restrictions to access to the documents set by the web server
            would be circumvented by anonymous FTP.

   9.2 Freely Available Servers
     * 9.2.1 Apache
          + There are a number of commercial web server packages
            available. A popular, freely available web-server is Apache.
            Current Apache binaries can be found at:

     http://www.apache.org/
          + ENSURE that the web server used is always patched against the
            latest vulnerabilities.
     * 9.2.2 publicfile
          + publicfile is a read-only HTTP and FTP server. It is
            available from:

     http://cr.yp.to/publicfile.html
     * 9.2.3 WU-FTPD
          + WU-FTPD is a replacement FTP daemon for Unix systems
            developed at Washington University. It is available from:

     http://www.wu-ftpd.org
     ftp://www.wu-ftpd.org

   9.3 Client Configuration 
***** TODO: not done yet, could be done for some common clients
     * DO NOT allow external programs to spawn for any downloaded files
       or content that contain executable material.
     * ENSURE web browsers are NOT configured to automatically run files
       when downloaded from the Internet. This includes not allowing
       browsers to automatically launch command line shells,
       interpreters, macro processors, and scripting language processors.
       This may be achieved using the application preferences for the
       browser.
     * DO consider terminating connections to secure pages if the web
       browser alerts that the host name in site certificate does not
       match the host name of the server the certificate came from.
     * DO consider rejecting site certificates signed by an unknown
       certifying authority.
     * ENSURE Java, JavaScript ActiveX are disabled in the web browser
       and built-in email readers that may come with the browser.
     * If you MUST enable Java, JavaScript, or ActiveX ENSURE you are
       running the latest version of your browser and respective run-time
       environments. This includes all related security patches.
     * DO NOT run a web browser as root.
     * CONSIDER removing cookies on a periodic basis. Alternatively
       consider making a symbolic link between the cookies file (e.g.
       ~/.netscape/cookies) and /dev/null.
     * DO consider utilising anti-virus software.
     * ENSURE web browsers are patched against the latest known security
       vulnerabilities.
     _________________________________________________________________

10.0 FTP: ftpd and anonymous ftp

     * 10.1 General Server Configuration
     * 10.2 Incoming Directories
     * 10.3 Freely Available Servers
     * 10.4 Anonymous FTP Only
            ____________________________________________________

   10.1 General Server Configuration
***** TODO: not done yet
     * ENSURE that you are using the most recent version of the FTP
       daemon of your choice.
     * CHECK all default configuration options on your FTP server.
     * ENSURE that your FTP server does not have the SITE EXEC command
       (see C.8 for command details), or that this command is disabled
       correctly.
     * ENSURE that you have set up a file /etc/ftpusers which specifies
       those users that are NOT allowed to connect to your ftpd. This
       should include, as a MINIMUM, the entries: root, bin, uucp,
       ingres, daemon, news, nobody and ALL vendor supplied accounts.
     * CHECK all default configuration options on your FTP server. Not
       all versions of ftp daemons are configurable. If you have a
       configurable version of ftp (e.g., WU-FTP) then make sure that all
       delete, overwrite, rename, chmod and umask options (there may be
       others) are NOT allowed for guests and anonymous users. In
       general, anonymous users should not have any unnecessary
       privileges.
     * ENSURE that you DO NOT include a command interpreter (such as a
       shell or tools like perl) in ~ftp/bin, ~ftp/usr/bin, ~ftp/sbin or
       similar directory configurations that can be executed by SITE
       EXEC. For an example of a previous vulnerability, refer to AusCERT
       advisory:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AA-2000.02
     * DO NOT keep system commands in ~ftp/bin, ~ftp/usr/bin, ~ftp/sbin
       or similar directory configurations that can be executed by SITE
       EXEC. It may be necessary to keep some commands, such as
       uncompress, in these locations. Consider the inclusion of each
       command on a case by case basis and be aware that the presence of
       such commands may make it possible for local users to gain
       unauthorised access. Be wary of including commands that can
       execute arbitrary commands. For example, some versions of tar may
       allow you to execute an arbitrary file.
***** Done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that you use an invalid password and user shell for the ftp
       entry in the system password file and the shadow password file (if
       you have one). It should look something like:

     ftp:*:400:400:Anonymous FTP:/home/ftp:/bin/false
       where /home/ftp is the anonymous FTP area.
***** TODO: check if done in check_anonftp (some file permissions are done
***** but it does not enforce 555)
     * ENSURE that the permissions of the FTP home directory ~ftp/ are
       set to 555 (read nowrite execute), owner set to root (NOT ftp).
***** Done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that you DO NOT have a copy of your real /etc/passwd file
       as ~ftp/etc/passwd. Create one from scratch with permissions 444,
       owned by root. It should not contain the names of any accounts in
       your real password file. It should contain only root and ftp.
       These should be dummy entries with disabled passwords e.g.:

     root:*:0:0:Ftp maintainer::
     ftp:*:400:400:Anonymous ftp::
       The password file is used only to provide uid to username mapping
       for ls(1) listings.
***** TODO: should be done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that you DO NOT have a copy of your real /etc/group file as
       ~ftp/etc/group. Create one from scratch with permissions 444,
       owned by root.
***** TODO: Done for rhosts but not for .forward
     * ENSURE the files ~ftp/.rhosts and ~ftp/.forward do not exist.
***** TODO: Not done
     * DO set the login shell of the ftp account to a non-functional
       shell such as /bin/false.
***** Done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE NO files or directories are owned by the ftp account or
       have the same group as the ftp account. If they are, it may be
       possible for an intruder to replace them with a trojan version.
***** TODO: Not done, should be done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE NO files or directories in the FTP area are world writable.
***** Done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that the anonymous ftp user cannot create files or
       directories in ANY directory unless required (Refer to 10.1)
***** TODO: not done, should be in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that the anonymous ftp user can only read information in
       public areas.
     * ENSURE that the system subdirectories ~ftp/etc and ~ftp/bin have
       the permissions 111 only, owner set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions of files in ~ftp/bin have the
       permissions 111 only, owner set to root.
     * ENSURE that the permissions of files in ~ftp/etc are set to 444,
       owner set to root.
***** TODO: not done, where should it be done ?
     * ENSURE that there is a mail alias for ftp to avoid mail bounces.
     * ENSURE /usr/spool/mail/ftp is owned by root with permissions 400.
     * NEVER mount disks from other machines to the ~ftp hierarchy unless
       they are set read-only in the mount command.

   10.2 Incoming Directories
***** TODO: should be done in check_anonftp
     * ENSURE that you don't have any writable directories. It is safest
       not to have any writable directories. If you do have any, we
       recommend that you limit the number to one, for instance an
       'upload' directory.
     * ENSURE that writable directories are not also readable.
       Directories that are both writable and readable may be used in an
       unauthorised manner.
     * ENSURE that any writable directories are owned by root and have
       permissions 1733.
     * DO put writable directories on a separate partition if possible.
       This will help to prevent denial of service attacks.

   10.3 Freely Available Servers
     * 10.3.1 WU-FTP
          + Make sure you are using the latest version of WU-FTPD and
            have applied all recommended patches. Versions of WU-FTPD
            prior to 2.6.1 have known security vulnerabilities.
          + WU-FTPD can be found at:

     http://www.wu-ftpd.org
     * 10.3.2 ProFTPD
          + ProFTPD does not support the SITE EXEC command.
          + ProFTPD can use mySQL password databases instead of password
            files, although at the time of writing there are a few known
            bugs, and compilation of ProFTPD with mySQL support can be
            difficult.
          + There are several mailing lists for ProFTPD, including
            development and help lists.
          + DO install the latest version of ProFTPD - previous versions
            are known to have bugs that may lead to security problems
            (but are more likely to cause problems in use.)
          + ProFTPD can be found at:

     http://www.proftpd.net/
     * 10.3.3 Publicfile
          + Publicfile is a read-only HTTP and FTP server. It is
            available from:

     http://cr.yp.to/publicfile.html

   10.4 Anonymous FTP Only
***** TODO: should be done in check_anonftp? some of this should be
***** dependant on server configuration.
     * To ascertain whether you are running anonymous FTP, try to connect
       to the localhost using anonymous FTP. Be sure to give an RFC822
       compliant username as the password (See C.9).
     * To disable anonymous FTP, move or delete all files in ~ftp/ and
       then remove the user ftp from your password file.
     * If you are running distributed passwords (e.g. NIS, NIS+) then you
       will need to check the password entries served to your machine as
       well as those in your local password file.
     * ENSURE that if you want to use anonymous FTP you have configured
       your server correctly. In general, anonymous users should not be
       allowed to create directories, delete anything, change the file
       system in any way (for instance change the permissions of a file)
       or upload files. If you do want anonymous users to upload files,
       follow the instructions above about general server configuration.
     * Limit the number of anonymous connections allowed, and also the
       number of times a single IP can be logged in at once. Anonymous
       should only be allowed to have one session active at a time -
       otherwise you leave yourself open to a DoS attack.
     _________________________________________________________________

11.0 File Services

     * 11.1 NFS
     * 11.2 Alternatives
          + 11.2.1 Samba
          + 11.2.2 AFS
          + 11.2.3 DFS
            ____________________________________________________

   11.1 NFS
***** TODO: Not done fully, some is done in check_exports, should check
***** everything included here.
   When using NFS, you implicitly trust the security of the NFS server to
   maintain the integrity of the mounted files.
     * DO filter NFS traffic at the router. Filter TCP/UDP on port 111
       TCP/UDP on port 2049 This will prevent machines not on your subnet
       from accessing file systems exported by your machines.
     * DO apply all available patches. NFS has had a number of security
       vulnerabilities.
     * DO disable NFS if you do not need it. See your vendor supplied
       documentation for detailed instructions.
     * DO enable NFS port monitoring. Calls to mount a file system will
       then be accepted from ports < 1024 only. This will provide added
       security in some circumstances. See your vendor's documentation to
       determine whether this is an option for your version of UNIX (see
       also 15.4).
     * DO use /etc/exports or /etc/dfs/dfstab to export ONLY the file
       systems you need to export. If you aren't certain that a system
       needs to be exported, then it probably shouldn't be exported.
     * DO NOT self-reference an NFS server in its own exports file (i.e.
       the exports file should not export the NFS server to itself in
       part or in total). In particular, ensure the NFS server is not
       contained in any netgroups listed in its exports file.
     * DO NOT allow the exports file to contain a 'localhost' entry.
     * DO export to fully qualified hostnames only (i.e. use the full
       machine address 'machinename.domainname.au' and do not abbreviate
       it to 'machinename').
     * ENSURE that you never export file systems unintentionally to the
       world. Use a -access=host.domainname.au option or equivalent in
       /etc/exports.
     * DO export file systems read-only (-ro) whenever possible. See the
       manual page for exports or dfstab for more information.
     * If NFS is required in your situation, then DO use the secure
       option in the exports file and mount requests (if the secure
       option is available).
     * DO use showmount -e to see what you currently have exported.
*** Done in check_perms
     * ENSURE that the permissions of /etc/exports are set to 644.
     * ENSURE that /etc/exports is owned by root.
*** TODO: Not done
     * ENSURE that you run a portmapper or rpcbind that does not forward
       mount requests from clients. A malicious NFS client can ask the
       server's portmapper daemon to forward requests to the mount
       daemon. The mount daemon processes the request as if it came
       directly from the portmapper. If the file system is self-mounted
       this gives the client unauthorised permissions to the file system.
       Refer to A.2.11 for how to obtain an alternate portmapper or
       rpcbind that disallow proxy access.
     * REMEMBER that changes in /etc/exports will take effect only after
       you run /usr/etc/exportfs or equivalent.
     * You may wish to test your NFS implementation with NFSbug, a
       program which scans for known NFS holes. It is available from:

     ftp://ftp.cs.vu.nl/pub/leendert/nfsbug.shar

   NOTE: A "web of trust" is created between hosts connected to each
   other via NFS. That is, you are trusting the security of any NFS
   server you use.

   11.2 Alternatives
     * 11.2.1 Samba
*** TODO: Not done, a check_samba is planned
       The Samba service provides filesystem shares to clients that are
       running other operating systems, usually a version of Microsoft
       Windows.
          + DO enable encrypted passwords for Samba using smbpasswd.
          + DO configure your shares for user-level security using the

     security = user
            parameter in smb.conf.
          + DO restrict access to your Samba service with the parameters:

     hosts allow =
     hosts deny =
          + DO protect your Samba services with firewall rules - Samba
            file services use NetBIOS over TCP/IP (also referred to as
            NBT and NetBT), so ports 135, 137, 138, and 139 (TCP) should
            be filtered.
          + CONSIDER using stronger authentication methods. Samba
            supports alternative authentication models, including
            Kerberos and Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM).
          + CONSIDER encrypting your Samba traffic. Samba supports the
            Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol.
       Samba sources and documentation are available from:

     http://www.samba.org/
     * 11.2.2 Andrew File System (AFS)
*** TODO: Not done
       AFS is a distributed filesystem that makes use of Kerberos to
       authenticate users. It allows the use of access control lists
       (ACLs). It is available from the Transarc Corporation.
          + CONSIDER using AFS if it is available for your platform and
            appropriate for your needs.
       Information is available from:

     ftp://ftp.transarc.com/pub/afs-contrib/doc/faq/afs-faq.html
     http://www.transarc.ibm.com/Product/EFS/AFS/index.html
     * 11.2.3 DFS
*** TODO: Not done
       DFS is a distributed filesystem, also available from the Transarc
       Corporation. Information is available from:

     http://www.transarc.ibm.com/Product/EFS/DFS/index.html
     _________________________________________________________________

12.0 X Window System

     * 12.1 X Security - General
     * 12.2 Problems with xdm
            ____________________________________________________

   Access to your X server may be controlled through either a host-based
   or user-based method. The former is left to the discretion of the
   Systems Administrator at your site and is useful as long as all hosts
   registered in the /etc/Xn.hosts file have users that can be trusted,
   where "n" represents your X server's number.

   This may not be possible at every site, so a better method is to
   educate each and every user about the security implications (see
   references below). Better still, when setting up a user, give them a
   set of X security related template files, such as .xserverrc and
   .xinitrc. These are located in the users home directory.

   You are strongly advised to read the section on X window system
   security referred to in the X Window System Administrators Guide
   (B.1.4).

   12.1 X Security - General
     * DO read the man pages for xauth and Xsecurity. Use this
       information to set up the security level you require.
**** TODO: Should be done by check_perms (it is only done for /var/tmp)
     * ENSURE that the permissions on /tmp are set to 1777. (i.e. the
       sticky bit should be set) The owner MUST always be root and group
       ownership should be set to group-id 0 or "system". If the sticky
       bit is set, no one other than the owner can delete the file
       /tmp/.X11-unix/X0, which is a socket for your X server. Once this
       file is deleted, your X server will no longer be accessible. See
       C.14 for example commands to set the correct permissions and
       ownership for /tmp.
*** TODO: Not done
     * DO use the X magic cookie mechanism MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 or better.
       With logins under the control of xdm (see 12.2), you can turn on
       authentication by editing the xdm-config file and setting the
       DisplayManager*authorize attribute to true. When granting access
       to the screen from another machine, use the xauth command in
       preference to the xhost command.
     * DO not permit access from arbitrary hosts. Remove all instances of
       the xhost + command from the system-wide Xsession file, from user
       .xsession files, and from any application programs or shell
       scripts that use the X window system.
     * CONSIDER encrypting your X network traffic, especially if you run
       remote clients locally. Ssh is a useful method.
*** Done by check_listeningprocs but not analysed
     * CONSIDER configuring workstations to disable listening for
       incoming X sessions over the network. This is done on some
       operating systems by using the -nolisten tcp option. You should
       consult your specific operating system's documentation for
       specific instructions.

   12.2 Problems with xdm
*** TODO: Not done

   DO not use any version of X11 prior to release 6 as it resolved
   security problems that existed in earlier versions. If necessary,
   obtain the source for X11R6 and compile and install it on your system.
   This may be obtained from:

     http://www.x11.org

     * xdm bypasses the normal getty and login functions, which means
       that quotas for the user, ownership of /dev/console and possibly
       other preventive measures put in place by you may be ignored.
     * You should consult your vendor and ask about potential security
       holes in xdm and what fixes are available.
     * Newer window managers that are available for Unix and Unix clones
       are provided with different X display managers (e.g. gdm, the
       Gnome project item) so you should check that there are no
       vulnerabilities specific to the instance of display manager that
       you choose.
     _________________________________________________________________

Section IV. Specific Operating Systems

13.0 BSD-derived Operating Systems

     * 13.1 BSD/OS
          + 13.1.1 Patches
          + 13.1.2 Security Advisories
     * 13.2 FreeBSD
          + 13.2.1 Patches
          + 13.2.2 Security Advisories
     * 13.3 NetBSD
          + 13.3.1 Patches
          + 13.3.2 Security Advisories
     * 13.4 OpenBSD
          + 13.4.1 Patches
          + 13.4.2 Security Advisories
            ____________________________________________________

   13.1 BSD/OS
     * 13.1.1 Patches
       Patches for the BSDI Internet Server and Internet Super Server can
       be found at:

     http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/patches/
     * 13.1.2 Security Advisories
       Security Advisories for the BSDI Internet Server and Internet
       Super Server can be found at:

     http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/

   13.2 FreeBSD
     * 13.2.1 Patches
       Patches for the FreeBSD operating system (choose your platform)
       can be found at:

     ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/releases/i386
     ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/releases/alpha
     * 13.2.2 Security Advisories

     http://www.freebsd.org/security/

   13.3 NetBSD
     * 13.3.1 Patches
       Security patches for the NetBSD operating system can be found at:

     http://www.netbsd.org/Security/
     * 13.3.2 Security Advisories

     http://www.netbsd.org/Security/

   13.4 OpenBSD
     * 13.4.1 Patches
       Patches for OpenBSD can be found at:

     ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/
     * 13.4.2 Security Advisories

     http://openbsd.org/errata.html
     _________________________________________________________________

14.0 Linux Distributions

     * 14.1 Caldera OpenLinux
          + 14.1.1 Patches
          + 14.1.2 Security Advisories
     * 14.2 Debian GNU/Linux
     * 14.3 Mandrake Linux
          + 14.3.1 Patches and Security Advisories
          + 14.3.2 Security Configuration Scripts
     * 14.4 Redhat Linux
          + 14.4.1 Patches and Security Advisories
          + 14.4.2 Security Configuration Scripts
     * 14.5 Slackware Linux
          + 14.5.1 Patches
          + 14.5.2 Security Advisories
          + 14.5.3 Security Configuration Scripts
     * 14.6 SuSE Linux
     * 14.7 TurboLinux
     * 14.8 Others
            ____________________________________________________

   14.1 Caldera OpenLinux
     * 14.1.1 Patches
       Updates for specific versions of the OpenLinux product can be
       found at:

     ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/
     * 14.1.2 Security Advisories

     http://www.calderasystems.com/support/security/

   14.2 Debian GNU/Linux
**** TODO: Should provide special link to patches and advisories (the
**** mailing list). Also should add a note about Bastille.

   Security information for Debian GNU/Linux, including links to security
   bulletins, patches and updates can be found at:

     http://www.debian.org/security/

   14.3 Mandrake Linux
     * 14.3.1 Patches and Security Advisories
       Security information for Mandrake Linux, including links to
       advisories, patches, and updates can be found at:

     http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/security/
     * 14.3.2 Security Configuration Scripts
       The Bastille Hardening System attempts to "harden" or "tighten"
       the Linux operating system. It currently supports RedHat and
       Mandrake systems. Additional information can be found at:

     http://bastille-linux.sourceforge.net

   14.4 RedHat Linux
     * 14.4.1 Patches and Security Advisories
       Security information for RedHat Linux, including links to
       advisories, patches, and updates can be found at:

     http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/
     * 14.4.2 Security Configuration Scripts
       The Bastille Hardening System attempts to "harden" or "tighten"
       the Linux operating system. It currently supports RedHat and
       Mandrake systems. Additional information can be found at:

     http://bastille-linux.sourceforge.net

   14.5 Slackware Linux
     * 14.5.1 Patches
       Security patches are incorporated into the latest stable version
       release as well as in the slackware-current release:

     ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/
     ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/
     * 14.5.2 Security Advisories
       Information about security patches is made available via mailing
       list and is documented in the ChangeLog:

     http://www.slackware.com/lists/
     http://www.slackware.com/changelog/
     * 14.5.3 Security Configuration Scripts
       SAStk, the Slackware Administrators Security tool kit, provides a
       simple scripted interface that aids in securing Slackware Linux.
       Additional information can be found at:

     http://www.sastk.org/

   14.6 SuSE Linux

   Security information for SuSE Linux, including links to advisories,
   patches, and updates can be found at:

     http://www.suse.com/us/support/security/index.html

   14.7 TurboLinux

   Security information for TurboLinux, including links to advisories,
   patches, and updates can be found at:

     http://www.turbolinux.com/security/

   14.8 Others

   For other distributions of Linux, please refer to your vendor's
   website. A useful starting point for finding Linux distribution
   vendor's sites is:

     http://www.linux.org/dist/index.html
     _________________________________________________________________

15.0 Solaris

     * 15.1 Patches
     * 15.2 IP Forwarding and Source Routing
     * 15.3 Stack Execution
     * 15.4 NFS Port Monitoring
     * 15.5 Framebuffers /dev/fbs
     * 15.6 Security Bulletins
     * 15.7 Sun BluePrints
     * 15.8 Solaris Security Toolkit (JASS)
            ____________________________________________________

   15.1 Patches
**** TODO: Should note that there is a checker for security patches
     * DO regularly ask your vendor for a complete list of patches. Sun
       regularly updates a list of recommended and security patches,
       which is available from:

     ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/
     http://sunsolve1.sun.com/

   15.2 IP Forwarding and Source Routing

   This is particularly relevant if you are using your Sun server as a
   bastion host or dual homed system.
**** Checked for in check_ndd
     * DO disable IP forwarding and source routing. To do this you will
       need to edit the file /etc/rc2.d/S69.inet and set the options
       ip_forwarding and ip_ip_forward_src_routed to zero as illustrated
       below:

     ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forwarding 0
     ndd -set /dev/ip ip_ip_forward_src_routed 0
       For the changes to take effect you will then need to reboot.

   15.3 Stack Execution
**** TODO: not done but should be
     * DO Disable executable stacks by default to stop "stack smashing"
       attacks based on buffer overflow exploits. To do this, you will
       need to edit the file /etc/system and add the following lines:

     set noexec_user_stack=1
     set noexec_user_stack_log=1
       Note that this may go against the SPARC and Intel ABIs and can be
       bypassed as required in programs with mprotect(2). For the changes
       to take effect you will then need to reboot.

   15.4 NFS Port Monitoring
**** TODO: not done but should be
     * DO enable NFS port monitoring. To do this add the following line
       to /etc/system:

     set nfs:nfs_portmon = 1 set nfssrv:nfs_portmon = 1
       See also 11.1.

   15.5 Framebuffers /dev/fbs
**** TODO: not done but should be
     * Solaris versions 2.3 and above have a protection facility for
       framebuffers which is a superset of the functionality provided by
       /etc/fbtab in SunOS 4.1.x.
     * Under Solaris, /dev/fbs is a directory that contains links to the
       framebuffer devices. The /etc/logindevperm file contains
       information that is used by login(1) and ttymon(1M) to change the
       owner, group, and permissions of devices upon logging into or out
       of a console device. By default, this file contains lines for the
       keyboard, mouse, audio, and frame buffer devices. A sample
       /etc/logindevperm file:
    #
    # File:      /etc/logindevperm
    # Purpose:   Specifies that upon login to /dev/console, the
    #            owner, group and permissions of all supported
    #            devices, including the framebuffer, will be set to
    #            the user's username, the user's group and 0600.
    # Comments:  SunOS specific.
    # Note:      You cannot use \ to continue a line.
    #
    # Format:
    # Device     Permission     Colon separated device list.
    #
    /dev/console    0600        /dev/kbd:/dev/mouse
    /dev/console    0600        /dev/sound/*         # audio devices
    /dev/console    0600        /dev/fbs/*           # frame buffers
               Read the man page for logindevperm(4) for more
       information.

   15.6 Security Bulletins
     * Security Bulletins are available under the SunSolve area of the
       Sun Microsystems web site:

     http://sunsolve.sun.com/
     http://www.sun.com/security/

   15.7 Sun BluePrints
     * BluePrints are Sun's leading source for in-depth technical
       information on Best Practices using Sun Solutions. Sun's
       BluePrints web site is available from:

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/
       The security section of the BluePrints archive is available from:

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/browsesubject.html#security
     * Some of the specific security BluePrints which are of interest for
       Solaris based hosts and networks include:
          + Solaris Operating Environment Security

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/0401/security-updt1.pdf
          + Solaris Operating Environment Network Settings for Security

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/1200/network-updt1.pdf
          + Solaris Minimization for Security

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/1100/minimize-updt1.pdf

   15.8 Solaris Security Toolkit (JASS)
     * The Solaris Security Toolkit, informally known as the JumpStart
       Architecture and Security Scripts (JASS) toolkit, provides a
       flexible and extensible mechanism to minimise, harden, and secure
       Solaris Operating Environment systems. The primary goal behind the
       development of this toolkit is to simplify and automate the
       process of securing Solaris systems. Additional information and
       downloads are available from:

     http://www.sun.com/security/jass/
     _________________________________________________________________

16.0 IRIX

     * 16.1 Patches
     * 16.2 Default Account Security
     * 16.3 Security Bulletins
            ____________________________________________________

   16.1 Patches
     * DO regularly ask your vendor for a complete list of patches.
     * Some IRIX security patches are available from:

     http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
     * DO read the FAQ on IRIX security. A copy may be obtained from:

     http://www-viz.tamu.edu/~sgi-faq/faq/html-1/security.html
     * For systems which do not have the chroot(1) command, use of
       chrootuid (A.2.1) may be of assistance.
     * rscan checks for many common IRIX-specific security
       vulnerabilities and problems. rscan is no longer supported by the
       author, but is still available from:
*** TODO: could include some of the functionalities in Tiger
     http://www.protomatter.com/rscan/

   16.2 Default Account Security
**** TODO: Not done
     * DO review the state of accounts that are installed by default in
       the IRIX operating system. Several of these accounts are installed
       with widely-known or empty passwords. Refer to 5.2 for information
       about checking for password-less accounts. Some of the accounts
       that may be installed with empty passwords are:
          + guest
          + demos
          + EZsetup
          + OutOfBox
          + 4Dgifts
          + lp
          + root
       Other accounts may be added with known passwords. Here is a
       partial list of accounts known to have easily guessed passwords.
          + lp
          + field
          + tutor
          + tour
          + 4Dgifts

   16.3 Security Advisories
     * DO review SGI security advisories. SGI security advisories can be
       found at:

     http://www.sgi.com/support/security/advisories.html
     _________________________________________________________________

17.0 Hewlett Packard UNIX (HP-UX)
**** TODO: Should note that HP-UX provides Bastille now
**** TODO: Should note that there is a checker for security patches

     * 17.1 Patches
            ____________________________________________________

   17.1 Patches
     * DO review and apply relevant security patches. Patches for HP-UX
       can be found via:

     http://us-support.external.hp.com/
     _________________________________________________________________

18.0 Digital/Compaq Tru64 UNIX

     * 18.1 Patches
            ____________________________________________________

   18.1 Patches
     * DO review and apply relevant security patches for your version of
       Digital Unix (or Tru64). Patches for these operating systems are
       available at:

     http://ftp.support.compaq.com/patches/.new/unix.shtml
     _________________________________________________________________

19.0 AIX
**** TODO: Should mention that there is a tool to harden AIX systems

     * 19.1 Patches
     * 19.2 Security Advisories
            ____________________________________________________

   19.1 Patches
     * DO review and apply relevant security patches. Fixes, drivers,
       updates and tools are available at:

     http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6000/fixes

   19.2 Security Advisories
     * DO subscribe to and review the IBM security advisories. IBM
       security advisories can be found at:

     http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6000/notification
     _________________________________________________________________

Section V. Appendixes

A. Useful security tools

   There are many freely available tools that provide a good mechanism
   for checking the security of your system. The list below is not a
   complete list, and you should NOT rely on these to do ALL of your work
   for you. They are intended to be only a guide. It is envisaged that
   you may write some site specific tools to supplement these. It is also
   envisaged that you may look around on HTTP or FTP servers for other
   useful tools.

   AusCERT and CERT/CC have not formally reviewed, evaluated or endorsed
   the tools described herein. The decision to use these tools is the
   responsibility of each user or organisation.
     * A.1 System Monitoring Tools
     * A.2 General Purpose Tools
     * A.3 Network Monitoring Tools
     * A.4 Network Access Control Tools
            ____________________________________________________

A.1 System Monitoring Tools

     * A.1.1 Analog
     * A.1.2 anlpasswd
     * A.1.3 Big Brother
     * A.1.4 CheckWtmp (DFN-CERT)
     * A.1.5 CheckXusers
     * A.1.6 Chkacct (DFN-CERT)
     * A.1.7 Chklastlog (DFN-CERT)
     * A.1.8 The Coroner's Toolkit
     * A.1.9 Portsentry
     * A.1.10 SWATCH
     * A.1.11 tcpdump
     * A.1.12 tcptrace
     * A.1.13 TCP Wrapper
     * A.1.14 Tiger
     * A.1.15 Tripwire
     * A.1.16 TTY-Watcher
            ____________________________________________________

     * A.1.1 Analog
       Analog is a utility for the analysis of web server log files. It
       is available from:

     http://www.analog.org/loganalysis/download.html
     * A.1.2 anlpasswd
       anlpasswd is a pro-active password checker and can replace the
       standard /bin/passwd. It is available from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/pwdutils/anlpasswd/
     * A.1.3 Big Brother
       Big Brother is a real-time network and system monitoring tool with
       a web browser interface. It is available at:

     http://bb4.com/
     * A.1.4 CheckWtmp (DFN-CERT)
       CheckWtmp is a tool to check for overwritten information in
       /var/adm/wtmp on SunOS 4.x systems. It is available via anonymous
       FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/logutils/chkwtmp/
     * A.1.5 CheckXusers
       CheckXusers is a script that checks for people logged on to a host
       from insecure X servers.

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/sysutils/checkXusers/
     * A.1.6 Chkacct (DFN-CERT)
       Chkacct is a tool to help with checking permissions. It can
       automatically correct file permissions or output a list of changes
       that need to be made. It is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/sysutils/chkacct/
     * A.1.7 Chklastlog (DFN-CERT)
       Chklastlog is a tool to check for overwritten information in
       /var/adm/lastlogin on SunOS 4.x systems. It is available via
       anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/logutils/chklastlog/
     * A.1.8 The Coroner's Toolkit
       The Coroners Toolkit (TCT) is a collection of software tools that
       provide a System Administrator with a framework for performing
       computer forensic analysis. TCT aims to automate the task of
       low-level forensic examination. It is available from:

     http://www.fish.com/tct/
     * A.1.9 Portsentry
       PortSentry is a program designed to detect and respond to port
       scans against a target host in real-time. It is available from:

     http://www.psionic.com/abacus/portsentry/
     * A.1.10 SWATCH
       Swatch, the Simple WATCHer program, is an easily configurable log
       file filter/monitor. Swatch monitors log files and acts to filter
       out unwanted data and take one or more user-specified actions
       based on patterns in the log. Swatch is available from

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/logutils/swatch/
     * A.1.11 tcpdump
       tcpdump is a protocol packet capture and dumper and capture
       program. It is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/netutils/tcpdump/
     * A.1.12 tcptrace
       tcptrace allows for analysis of TCP dump files as produced by
       programs such as tcpdump, snoop etc. It is available from:

     http://masaka.cs.ohiou.edu/tcptrace/tcptrace_new/
     * A.1.13 TCP Wrapper
       This software gives logging and access control to most network
       services. It is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/
     * A.1.14 Tiger
       This package identifies common security and configuration
       problems. It also checks for common signs of intrusion. It is
       available via anonymous FTP.

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/scanners/tiger/
     * A.1.15 Tripwire
       This package maintains a checksum database of important system
       files. It can serve as an early intrusion detection system. It is
       freely available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/ids/tripwire/
       or via HTTP from:

     http://www.tripwire.com/downloads/tripwire_asr/
       Tripwire is also available as a commercial software package from
       the following web site:

     http://www.tripwire.com
     * A.1.16 TTY-Watcher
       TTY-Watcher is a utility to monitor and control users on a single
       system. TTY-Watcher is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/sysutils/ttywatcher/
     _________________________________________________________________

A.2 General Purpose Tools

     * A.2.1 chrootuid
     * A.2.2 Crack and "John the Ripper"
     * A.2.3 Fix-Modes
     * A.2.4 logdaemon
     * A.2.5 lsof
     * A.2.6 MD5
     * A.2.7 NoShell
     * A.2.8 OPIE and S/KEY
     * A.2.9 overflow_wrapper
     * A.2.10 PGP/GnuPG
     * A.2.11 portmapper/rpcbind
     * A.2.12 RBAC
     * A.2.13 ssh
            ____________________________________________________

     * A.2.1 chrootuid
       Allows chroot functionality. It is available from:

     ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/
     * A.2.2 Crack and "John the Ripper"
       Crack is a fast password cracking program designed to assist site
       administrators in ensuring that users use effective passwords.
       Available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/pwdutils/
       John the Ripper is a password cracker, designed to detect weak
       Unix passwords. It is available from:

     http://www.openwall.com/john/
     * A.2.3 FixModes
       The FixModes scripts run on Solaris and remove group and world
       write permissions on specific system files and directories. The
       new permissions make it harder for non-root users to become root,
       and for non-root users to modify system files. FixModes is
       available from:

     http://www.sun.com/blueprints/tools/
     * A.2.4 logdaemon
       Written by Wietse Venema, this package includes replacements for
       rsh and rlogin daemons. By default these versions do not accept
       wild cards in host.equiv or .rhost files. They also have an option
       to disable user .rhost files. logdaemon is available via anonymous
       FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/
     * A.2.5 lsof
       lsof reports files open by a process, files open on a partition as
       well as processes listening on a port/socket and processes which
       have a file open. Available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/sysutils/lsof/
     * A.2.6 MD5
       MD5 is a message digest algorithm. Tools to verify MD5 checksums
       are included with many current operating systems, for example
       md5(1) (FreeBSD) or md5sum (Linux). Otherwise, an implementation
       of MD5 is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/crypto/md5/
     * A.2.7 noshell
       This program is designed to provide the system administrator with
       additional information about who is logging into disabled
       accounts. It is used as a replacement shell, to be specified in
       the login shell entry for the account in the unix password file.
       It is available from:

     http://www.fish.com/titan/src1/noshell.c
       Detailed instructions on installing and usage of noshell are
       available from:

     http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i049.02.ht
     ml
     * A.2.8 OPIE and S/KEY
       The S/KEY one-time password system provides authentication over
       networks that are subject to eavesdropping/reply attacks. This
       system has several advantages compared with other one-time or
       multi-use authentication systems. The user's secret password never
       crosses the network during login. This directory contains
       information, the latest version and patches. It is available via
       anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/password/SKey/
       OPIE is an implementation of the One-Time Password (OTP) standard
       specified in RFC 1938. Available via anonymous FTP from:

     http://www.inner.net/pub/opie/
     * A.2.9 overflow_wrapper
       AusCERT designed this wrapper to limit exploitation of programs
       which have command line argument buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
       It is available via anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/tools/overflow_wrapper/overflo
     w_wrapper.c
     * A.2.10 PGP/GnuPG
       PGP Pretty Good Privacy implements encryption and authentication.
       GnuPG is a similar utility released under the GNU public licence.
       PGP is available from:

     http://www.pgpi.org/
       GnuPG is available from:

     http://www.gnupg.org/
     * A.2.11 portmapper/rpcbind
       These are portmapper/rpcbind replacements written by Wietse Venema
       that disallow proxy access to the mount daemon via the portmapper.
       Choose the one suitable for your system. They are available via
       anonymous FTP from:

     ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/
     * A.2.12 RBAC
       Role Based Access Control (RBAC) allows each user to be assigned
       one or more roles and each role is assigned one or more privileges
       that are permitted to users in that role. Security administration
       with RBAC consists of determining the operations that must be
       executed by persons in particular jobs, and assigning employees to
       the proper roles. Complexities introduced by mutually exclusive
       roles or role hierarchies are handled by the RBAC software, making
       security administration easier. Additional information and
       downloads are available from:

     http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac/
     * A.2.13 ssh
       Secure Shell (ssh) provides for encrypted remote communications
       between hosts. It can replace rsh, rlogin, and others. It is
       available from:

     http://www.ssh.fi/
     http://www.openssh.com/
     http://www.ssh.com/
     _________________________________________________________________

A.3 Network Monitoring Tools

     * A.3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
**** TODO: Note: Should mention Tiger too and TARA
          + A.3.1.1 Snort
          + A.3.1.2 NFR
          + A.3.1.3 ISS RealSecure
          + A.3.1.4 Tripwire
          + A.3.1.5 Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System
     * A.3.2 Vulnerability Scanning Tools
          + A.3.2.1 Nessus
          + A.3.2.2 SAINT
          + A.3.2.3 SARA
          + A.3.2.4 bv-Control
     * A.3.3 Other Useful Tools
          + A.3.3.1 Argus
          + A.3.3.2 Ethereal
          + A.3.3.3 ifstatus
          + A.3.3.4 AntiSniff
          + A.3.3.5 NOCOL
          + A.3.3.6 NMAP
            ____________________________________________________

     * A.3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
          + A.3.1.1 Snort
            Snort is a lightweight network intrusion detection system,
            capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet
            logging on IP networks. It can perform protocol analysis,
            content searching/matching and can be used to detect a
            variety of attacks and probes. More information is available
            at:

     http://www.snort.org/
          + A.3.1.2 NFR
            Network Flight Recorder (NFR) is a customisable commercial
            IDS. More information is available at:

     http://www.nfr.net/
          + A.3.1.3 RealSecure
            RealSecure is a commercial IDS from Internet Security Systems
            (ISS). More information is available at:

     http://www.iss.net/securing_e-business/security_products/intrusion_
     detection/
          + A.3.1.4 Tripwire
            This package maintains a checksum database of important
            system files. It can serve as an early intrusion detection
            system. It is freely available via anonymous ftp from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/ids/tripwire/
            or via HTTP from:

     http://www.tripwire.com/downloads/tripwire_asr/
            Tripwire is also available as a commercial software package
            from the following web site:

     http://www.tripwire.com
          + A.3.1.5 Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System
            The Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS), formerly
            known as the Cisco NetRanger system, is a real-time,
            network-based IDS designed to detect, report, and terminate
            unauthorized activity throughout a network. Additional
            information is available from:

     http://www.wheelgroup.com/warp/public/cc/pd/sqsw/sqidsz/
     * A.3.2 Vulnerability Scanning Tools
          + A.3.2.1 Nessus
            Nessus is a free, programmable graphical vulnerability
            assessment and scanning tool. It offers a number of features,
            such as a modular architecture, and its own scripting
            language. Nessus is available at:

     http://www.nessus.org/
          + A.3.2.2 SAINT
            SAINT is a vulnerability assessment tool, similar to SATAN,
            which allows network administrators to scan their networks
            for known vulnerabilities in specific software packages. More
            information is available at:

     http://www.wwdsi.com/saint
          + A.3.2.3 SARA
            The Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) is another
            vulnerability assessment and scanning tool. It supports the
            use of CVE nomenclature among other things. More information
            is available at:

     http://www-arc.com/sara/
          + A.3.2.4 bv-Control
            bv-Control from BindView is a cross-platform package that
            provides vulnerability assessments as well as assiting in
            routine system administration. More information is available
            at:

     http://www.bindview.com/products/control/
     * A.3.3 Other Useful Tools
          + A.3.3.1 Argus
            Argus is an advanced IP network transaction auditing tool.
            Classified as a Real Time IP Flow Monitor, Argus generates a
            persistent audit of all network transactions and their
            performance, without the need for configuration.
            The data that Argus generates can be used for a wide range of
            tasks that are traditionally benefited from audit, of
            particular interest are Network Security and Network
            Assurance and Performance Management. Argus is available at:

     ftp://ftp.andrew.cmu.edu/pub/argus/
          + A.3.3.2 Ethereal
            Ethereal is a free network protocol analyzer for Unix and
            Windows. It allows you to examine data from a live network or
            from a capture file on disk. You can interactively browse the
            capture data, viewing summary and detail information for each
            packet. Ethereal has several powerful features, including a
            rich display filter language and the ability to view the
            reconstructed stream of a TCP session. More information is
            available from:

     http://www.ethereal.com/
          + A.3.3.3 ifstatus
            ifstaus can be run on a UNIX system to check the network
            interfaces for any that are in debug or promiscuous mode.
            This may be the sign of an intruder performing network
            monitoring to steal passwords and the like (see CERT/CC
            Advisory CA-1994-01). ifstatus is available from:

     ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/sysutils/ifstatus/
          + A.3.3.4 AntiSniff
            AntiSniff is a tool which can scan a network and detect
            whether or not the network interfaces on any computers are in
            promiscuous mode, since this is often a sign that a computer
            has been compromised.
            Antisniff was designed to detect compromised machines with IP
            stacks that a remote attacker could utilize to sniff network
            traffic. It was not designed to detect hardware based network
            probes or special purpose network analysers which an attacker
            would need physical access to install. More information is
            available from:

     http://www.securitysoftwaretech.com/antisniff/
          + A.3.3.5 Network Operations Center On-Line (NOCOL)
            Network Operation Center On-Line (NOCOL) is a network
            monitoring package that runs on Unix platforms. It can
            monitor various network variables such as ICMP or RPC
            reachability, nameservers, ethernet load, port reachability,
            host performance, SNMP traps, modem line usage, appletalk &
            novell routes and services, BGP peers, etc. The software is
            extensible and allows new monitors to be added. NOCOL is
            available from:

     ftp://ftp.netplex-tech.com/pub/
            Additional information is available from:

     http://www.netplex-tech.com/software/nocol/
          + A.3.3.6 Nmap
            Nmap is an open-sourced tool for port scanning large
            networks. It features a variety of modes of scanning and
            remote operating system identification. More information is
            available from:

     http://www.nmap.org/
     _________________________________________________________________

A.4 Network Access Control Tools

     * A.4.1 Proxy Servers
          + A.4.1.1 TIS Firewall Toolkit (fwtk)
          + A.4.1.2 Dante
          + A.4.1.3 JAVA SOCKS Server
          + A.4.1.4 Muffin World Wide Web Filtering System
          + A.4.1.5 Squid Web Proxy Cache
     * A.4.2 Packet Filtering Tools
          + A.4.2.1 ipfw
          + A.4.2.2 ipfwadm
          + A.4.2.3 IP Filter (ipf)
          + A.4.2.4 ipchains
          + A.4.2.5 netfilter/iptables
          + A.4.2.6 SunScreen Lite
            ____________________________________________________

     * A.4.1 Proxy Servers
       Proxy servers can be used to authenticate and forward specific
       service requests between networks. Typically, a proxy server
       replaces a regular system service and then arbitrates sessions
       between legitimate clients and servers. Proxy servers are often
       used in conjunction with packet filtering tools (See A.4.2) to
       enforce network security policies. Many commercial and
       non-commercial packages offer proxy server functionality. Below
       are pointers to several non-commercial software packages that
       perform proxy services.
          + A.4.1.1 TIS Firewall Toolkit (fwtk)

     http://www.tis.com/research/software/
          + A.4.1.2 Dante

     http://www.inet.no/dante/
          + A.4.1.3 JAVA SOCKS Server

     http://jsocks.sourceforge.net/
          + A.4.1.4 Muffin World Wide Web Filtering System

     http://muffin.doit.org/
          + A.4.1.5 Squid Web Proxy Cache

     http://www.squid-cache.org/
     * A.4.2 Packet Filtering Tools
       Packet filtering tools provide the ability to selectively control
       the forwarding TCP/IP packets through a device with two or more
       network interfaces. Packet filtering can be used to enforce
       network security policies through the construction and use of a
       series of packet filtering rules. Many commercial and
       non-commercial packages offer packet filtering functionality.
       Below are pointers to several non-commercial software packages
       that perform packet filtering.
          + A.4.2.1 ipfw
            ipfw is an older packet filtering tool distributed as a part
            of some BSD-based operating systems, particularly FreeBSD.
            Information about ipfw is available from the FreeBSD
            Handbook.

     http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/firewalls.html
          + A.4.2.2 ipfwadm
            Ipfwadm is a packet filtering tool distributed as a part of
            some older Linux distributions. It is designed for use with
            older (e.g., prior to version 2.2.x) Linux kernels.
            Information about ipfwadm is available from the author's
            website:

     http://www.xos.nl/linux/ipfwadm/
          + A.4.2.3 IP Filter (ipf)
            IP Filter, or ipf, is a packet filtering tool distributed as
            a part of BSD-based operating systems such as FreeBSD,
            OpenBSD, and NetBSD. It is also available for use on other
            platforms such as Solaris, SunOS, IRIX, and HP-UX. More
            information is available from:

     http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~avalon/
          + A.4.2.4 ipchains
            Ipchains is a packet filtering tool distributed as a part of
            many current Linux distributions. It is designed for use with
            newer (e.g., version 2.2.x) kernels. Information about
            ipchains is available from one of several locations:

     http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/ipchains/
     http://www.samba.org/netfilter/ipchains/
     http://netfilter.kernelnotes.org/ipchains/
          + A.4.2.5 netfilter/iptables
            Netfilter and iptables are packet filtering tools being
            developed in conjunction with newer (e.g., 2.3.x) Linux
            kernels for use in the 2.4.x series of Linux kernels.
            Information about netfilter and iptables is available from
            one of several locations.

     http://netfilter.filewatcher.org/
     http://netfilter.samba.org/
     http://netfilter.kernelnotes.org/
          + A.4.2.6 SunScreen Lite
            SunScreen Lite offers high-speed, dynamic, stateful packet
            screening, and is designed to protect individual servers or
            small workgroups. It is available for no additional cost to
            users of Solaris 8. More information is available at:

     http://www.sun.com/software/securenet/lite/
     _________________________________________________________________

B. References

     * B.1 Bibliography
     * B.2 On-line references
            ____________________________________________________

B.1 Bibliography

     * B.1.1 Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2nd Edition
     * B.1.2 Solaris Security
     * B.1.3 UNIX System Security: A Guide for Users and System
       Administrators
     * B.1.4 Volume 8: X Window System Administrator's Guide
     * B.1.5 Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets and Solutions
     * B.1.6 Firewalls and Internet Security
     * B.1.7 Building Internet Firewalls, Second Edition
     * B.1.8 Maximum Security - A Hacker's Guide to Protecting Your
       Internet Site and Network
     * B.1.9 UNIX System Administration Handbook (third edition)
     * B.1.10 Essential System Administration, 2nd Edition
     * B.1.11 Real World Linux Security: Intrusion Prevention, Detection
       and Recovery
     * B.1.12 Managing NFS and NIS, 2nd Edition
     * B.1.13 Unix Secure Shell (McGraw-Hill Tools Series)
     * B.1.14 Hack Proofing Your Network - Internet Tradecraft
     * B.1.15 Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition
     * B.1.16 TCP/IP Illustrated Vols I, II, III
            ____________________________________________________

     * B.1.1 Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2nd Edition
       By Simson Garfinkel & Gene Spafford
       2nd Edition April 1996
       (C) 1996, 1991 O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
       ISBN: 1565921488
     * B.1.2 Solaris Security
       By Peter H. Gregory
       (C) 1999 Prentice Hall PTR/Sun Microsystems Press
       ISBN: 0130960535
     * B.1.3 UNIX system security: A Guide for Users and System
       Administrators
       By David A. Curry
       (C) 1992 Addison-Wesley Professional Computing Series
       ISBN: 0201606402
     * B.1.4 Volume 8: X Window System Administrator's Guide
       By Linda Mui & Eric Pearce
       1st Edition October 1992
       (C) 1992 O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
       ISBN: 0937175838
     * B.1.5 Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets and Solutions
       By Joel Scambray, Stuart McClure and George Kurtz
       (C) 2000 McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing
       ISBN: 0072127481
     * B.1.6 Firewalls and Internet Security
       By William R. Cheswick & Steven M. Bellovin
       (C) 1994 AT&T Bell Laboratories, Inc.
       Addison-Wesley Professional Computing Series
       ISBN: 0201633574
     * B.1.7 Building Internet Firewalls, Second Edition
       By Elizabeth D. Zwicky, Simon Cooper, & D. Brent Chapman
       (C) 1995 O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
       ISBN: 1565928717
     * B.1.8 Maximum Security - A Hacker's Guide to Protecting Your
       Internet Site and Network
       By Anonymous
       (C) 1998 SAMS Publishing
       ISBN: 0672313413
     * B.1.9 UNIX System Administration Handbook (third edition)
       Evi Nemeth, Garth Snyder, Trent R. Hein and Scott Seebass
       (C) 2001 Prentice-Hall PTR
       ISBN: 0130206016
     * B.1.10 Essential System Administration, 2nd Edition
       By Aeleen Frisch
       2nd Edition September 1995
       (C) 1995 O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
       ISBN: 1565921275
     * B.1.11 Real World Linux Security: Intrusion Prevention, Detection
       and Recovery
       By Bob Toxen
       (C) 2000 Prentice Hall PTR/Sun Microsystems Press
       ISBN: 0130281875
     * B.1.12 Managing NFS and NIS, 2nd Edition
       By Hal Stern
       2nd Edition June 2001
       (C) 2001 O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
       ISBN: 1565925106
     * B.1.13 Unix Secure Shell (McGraw-Hill Tools Series)
       By Anne H. Carasik
       (C) 1999 Osborne McGraw-Hill
       ISBN: 0071349332
     * B.1.14 Hack Proofing Your Network - Internet Tradecraft
       By Ryan Russell
       (C) 2000 Syngress
       ISBN: 1928994156
     * B.1.15 Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition
       By Bruce Schneier
       (C) 1995 John Wiley & Sons
       ISBN: 0471117099
     * B.1.16 TCP/IP Illustrated Volumes 1, 2, 3
       By Gary R. Wright and W. Richard Stevens
       (C) 1994, 1995, 1996 Addison-Wesley
       ISBN: 0201633469 (Vol 1 - The Protocols)
       ISBN: 020163354X (Vol 2 - The Implementation)
       ISBN: 0201634953 (Vol 3 - TCP for Transactions, HTTP, NNTP, and
       the UNIX(R) Domain Protocols)
     _________________________________________________________________

B.2 On-line references

     * B.2.1 Unix Flavours
     * B.2.2 General Security
     * B.2.3 Mailing Lists
     * B.2.4 Archives, News and Research
     * B.2.5 Secure Programming
            ____________________________________________________

     * B.2.1 Unix Flavours
          + Linux Security Administrator's Guide
            By Dave Wreski, dave@nic.com
            http://www.nic.com/~dave/SecurityAdminGuide/SecurityAdminGuid
            e.html
          + Armoring Linux - Preparing your linux box for the Internet
            By Lance Spitzner, lance@spitzner.net?Subject=Armoring Linux
            http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz/linux.html
          + Armoring Solaris - Preparing Solaris for a firewall
            By Lance Spitzner, lance@spitzner.net?Subject=Armoring
            Solaris
            http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz/armoring.html
          + Solaris Security Advisories
            http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/secBulletin.pl
          + Sun BluePrints - Security
            http://www.sun.com/blueprints/browsesubject.html#security
          + FreeBSD Security Advisories
            http://www.freebsd.org/security/
          + NetBSD Security Advisories
            http://www.netbsd.org/Security/
          + OpenBSD Security Advisories
            http://openbsd.org/errata.html
          + BSD/OS Technical Support
            http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/
          + Caldera OpenLinux Security Advisories
            http://www.calderasystems.com/support/security/
          + Debian GNU/Linux Security Advisories
            http://www.debian.org/security/
**** TODO: Note should mention the Securing Debian HOWTO
          + RedHat Linux Security Advisories
            http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/
**** TODO: Note should mention the RedHat Security Guide
          + Mandrake Linux Security Advisories
            http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/security/
          + SuSE Linux Security Advisories
            http://www.suse.com/us/support/security/index.html
          + TurboLinux Security Advisories
            http://www.turbolinux.com/security/
          + Slackware Linux Security Advisories
            http://www.slackware.com/lists/archive/
          + IRIX Security Advisories
            http://www.sgi.com/support/security/advisories.html
          + Hewlett Packard UNIX (HP-UX) Support
            http://us-support.external.hp.com/
          + Digital UNIX and Compaq Tru64 Support
            http://www.compaq.com/support/
     * B.2.2 General Security
          + AusCERT References (Checklists & Papers)
            http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Auscert_info/papers.htm
            l
          + The World Wide Web Security FAQ
            By Lincoln D. Stein, lstein@cshl.org
            http://www.w3.org/Security/Faq/www-security-faq.html
          + Firewall Seen FAQ
            By Robert Graham, firewall-seen@robertgraham.com
            http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html
          + CERT Coordination Center - Finding Site Contacts
            Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University
            http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/finding_site_contacts.html
          + The web site of Rob Thomas
            Security related documents, tools, and links
            http://www.cymru.com/~robt/
               o Secure BIND Template
                 By Rob Thomas, robt@cymru.com
                 http://www.cymru.com/~robt/Docs/Articles/secure-bind-tem
                 plate.html
     * B.2.3 Mailing Lists
          + The CERT/CC Advisory Mailing List
            http://www.cert.org/contact_cert/certmaillist.html
          + BugTraq
            By SecurityFocus.com
            http://www.securityfocus.com/about/feedback/subscribe.html
            SecurityFocus.com also hosts several other mailing lists
            dedicated to specific security topics. These are available at
            the above mentioned web site.
          + SANS Newsletter Subscription Service
            http://www.sans.org/sansnews
     * B.2.4 Archives, News and Research 
          + AusCERT Advisories and Alerts
            http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Advisories/aus_advisori
            es.html
          + AusCERT External Security Bulletins
            http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Advisories/esb_advisori
            es.html
          + CERT/CC Alerts
            http://www.cert.org/nav/alerts.html
          + CERT/CC Current Activity
            http://www.cert.org/current/current_activity.html
          + SecurityFocus.com
            http://www.securityfocus.com/
          + SANS Institute - Information Security Reading Room
            http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/index.htm
          + Internet Security Systems: X-Force
            http://xforce.iss.net/
          + COAST
            http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist/
     * B.2.5 Secure Programming
          + AusCERT Secure Programming Checklist
            ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/papers/secure_programmin
            g_checklist
          + Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO
            http://dwheeler.com/secure-programs/
          + The World Wide Web Security FAQ
            http://www.w3.org/Security/faq/www-security-faq.html
          + Secure Programming
            http://securityfocus.com/forums/secprog/secure-programming.ht
            ml
          + Secure Programming - "The Foundation to Secure Computing"
            http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/code/sec_programming.htm
     _________________________________________________________________

C. List of commands by flavour

   Notes:
     * The commands given here are examples only. Please consult the
       manual pages for your system if you are unsure of the consequence
       of any command.
     * BSD-style commands are marked as BSD commands, similarly for SVR4.
       Commands which are not labelled are expected to work for both.
     * Full directory paths and program options may vary for different
       flavours of UNIX. If in doubt, consult your vendor documentation.

     * C.1 Restart inetd
     * C.2 Ascertain which services are registered with the portmapper
     * C.3 Rebuild alias maps
     * C.4 Printing the umask value for each user
     * C.5 Set sendmail log level to 9
     * C.6 Set syslog log level for mail messages
     * C.7 (Rebuilding and) restarting sendmail(8)
     * C.8 Test whether ftpd supports SITE EXEC
     * C.9 Ascertain whether anonymous FTP is enabled
     * C.10 Ensure that '*' in the password field is correctly
       implemented
     * C.11 Find .exrc files
     * C.12 Locate and print .forward files
     * C.13 Remove execute permission on /usr/lib/expreserve
     * C.14 Set ownership and permissions for /tmp correctly
     * C.15 Find group and world writable files and directories
     * C.16 Find files with the SUID or SGID bit enabled
     * C.17 Find normal files in /dev
     * C.18 Find block or character special files
     * C.19 Avoid NFS mounted file systems when using /bin/find
            ____________________________________________________

   C.1 Restart inetd

   BSD commands
     # /bin/ps -aux | /bin/grep -E "inetd|^USER" | /bin/grep -v grep
     # /bin/kill -HUP <inetd-PID>

   SVR4 commands
     # /bin/ps -ef | /bin/grep inetd | /bin/grep -v grep
     # /bin/kill -HUP <inetd-PID>

   C.2 Ascertain which services are registered with the portmapper
     # /usr/bin/rpcinfo -p

   C.3 Rebuild alias maps
     # /usr/bin/newaliases

   If you run NIS (YP), you will then need to rebuild your maps to have
   the change take effect over all clients:
     # (cd /var/yp; /usr/bin/make aliases)

   C.4 Printing the umask value for each user

   Use the following shell script:
    #!/bin/sh
    PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/ucb

    HOMEDIRS=`cat /etc/passwd | awk -F":" 'length($6) > 0 {print $6}' | sort -u
`
    FILES=".cshrc .login .profile"

    for dir in $HOMEDIRS
    do
            for file in $FILES
            do
            grep -s umask /dev/null $dir/$file
            done
    done

   C.5 Set sendmail log level to 9

   Include lines describing the log level (similar to the following two)
   in the options part of the general configuration information section
   of the sendmail configuration file:
     # log level
     OL9

   The log level syntax changed in sendmail 8.7 to:
     # log level
     O LogLevel=9

   C.6 Set syslog log level for mail messages

   Include lines describing the logging required (similar to the
   following two) in the syslog.conf file:
     mail.info                       /dev/console
     mail.info                       /var/adm/messages

   For the change to take effect, you must then instruct syslog to reread
   the configuration file.

   BSD commands
   Get the current PID of syslog:
     # /bin/ps -aux | /bin/grep syslogd | /bin/grep -v grep

   Then tell syslog to reread its configuration file:
     # /bin/kill -HUP <syslog-PID>

   SVR4 commands
   Get the current PID of syslog:
     # /bin/ps -ef | /bin/grep syslogd | /bin/grep -v grep

   Then tell syslog to reread its configuration file:
     # /bin/kill -HUP <syslog-PID>

   NOTE: In the logs, look for error messages like:
   - mail to or from a single pipe ("|")
   - mail to or from an obviously invalid user (e.g., bounce or blah)

   C.7 (Rebuilding and) restarting sendmail(8)

   To rebuild the frozen configuration file, firstly do:
     # /usr/lib/sendmail -bz

   NOTE: The above process does not apply to sendmail v8.x which does not
   support frozen configuration files.

   To restart sendmail(8), you should kill *all* existing sendmail(8)
   processes by sending them a TERM signal using kill, then restart
   sendmail(8).

   BSD commands
   Get the pid of every running sendmail process:
     # /bin/ps -aux | /bin/grep sendmail | /bin/grep -v grep

   Kill every running sendmail process and restart sendmail:
     # /bin/kill <pid>     #pid of every running sendmail process
     # /usr/lib/sendmail -bd -q1h

   SVR4 commands
   Get the pid of every running sendmail process:
     # /bin/ps -ef | /bin/grep sendmail | /bin/grep -v grep

   Kill every running sendmail process and restart sendmail:
     # /bin/kill <pid>     #pid of every running sendmail process
     # /usr/lib/sendmail -bd -q1h

   C.8 Test whether ftpd supports SITE EXEC

   For normal users:
     % ftp localhost 21
     USER username
     PASS password
     SITE EXEC

   For anonymous users:
     % ftp localhost 21
     USER ftp
     PASS username@domainname.au
     SITE EXEC

   You should see the response "5nn error return" (e.g., "500 'SITE EXEC'
   command not understood"). If your ftp daemon has SITE EXEC enabled,
   make sure you have the most recent version of the daemon. Older
   versions of ftpd allow any user to gain shell access using the SITE
   EXEC command. Use QUIT to end the telnet session.

   C.9 Ascertain whether anonymous FTP is enabled
     % ftp localhost
     Connected to localhost
     220 hostname FTP server ready
     Name (localhost:username):  anonymous
     331 Guest login ok, send username as password
     Password:  user@domain.au
     230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
     Remote system type is UNIX.
     Using binary mode to transfer files.
     ftp>

   C.10 Ensure that '*' in the password field is correctly implemented
     * Try using NIS with the '*' in the password field for example:
       +:*:0:0::: If NIS users cannot log in to that machine, remove the
       '*' and try the next test.
     * With the '*' removed, try logging in again. If NIS users can log
       in AND you can also log in unauthenticated as the user '+', then
       your implementation is vulnerable. Contact the vendor for more
       information. If NIS users can log in ANC you cannot log in as the
       user '+', your implementation should not be vulnerable to this
       problem.

   C.11 Find .exrc files
    # /bin/find /  -name '.exrc' -exec /bin/cat {} \; -print

   See also C.19.

   C.12 Find .forward files
    # /bin/find / -name '.forward' -exec /bin/cat {} \; -print

   See also C.19.

   C.13 Remove execute permission on /usr/lib/expreserve
    # /bin/chmod 400 /usr/lib/expreserve

   C.14 Set ownership and permissions for /tmp correctly
     # /bin/chown root /tmp
     # /bin/chgrp 0 /tmp
     # /bin/chmod 1777 /tmp

   NOTE: This will NOT recursively set the sticky bit on sub-directories
   below /tmp, such as /tmp/.X11-unix and /tmp/.NeWS-unix; you may have
   to set these manually or through the system startup files.

   C.15 Find group and world writable files and directories
     # /bin/find / -type f \( -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -lg {} \;

     # /bin/find / -type d \( -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -ldg {} \;

   See also C.19.

   C.16 Find files with the SUID or SGID bit enabled
     # /bin/find / -type f \( -perm -004000 -o -perm -002000 \) \
       -exec ls -lg {} \;

   See also C.19.

   C.17 Find normal files in /dev
     # /bin/find /dev -type f -exec ls -l {} \;

   See also C.19.

   C.18 Find block or character special files
     # /bin/find / \( -type b -o -type c \) -print | grep -v '^/dev/'

   See also C.19.

   C.19 Avoid NFS mounted file systems when using /bin/find
     # /bin/find / \( \! -fstype nfs -o -prune \) <expression>

   As an example, <expression> could be
     -type f \( -perm -004000 -o -perm -002000 \) -exec ls -lg {} \;
     _________________________________________________________________

D. Abbreviated Checklist

   It is intended that this short version of the checklist be used in
   conjunction with the full checklist as a progress guide (mark off the
   sections as you go so that you remember what you have done so far).

Section I. The First Step

     * [   ]  1.0 Patches

Section II. The Basic Operating System

     * [   ]  2.0 Network Services
          + [   ]  2.1 /etc/inetd.conf
          + [   ]  2.2 tcp_wrapper
          + [   ]  2.3 fingerd
          + [   ]  2.4 "r" Commands
          + [   ]  2.5 /etc/hosts.equiv
          + [   ]  2.6 $HOME/.rhosts
          + [   ]  2.7 /etc/netgroup
          + [   ]  2.8 /etc/services
          + [   ]  2.9 /etc/hosts.lpd
          + [   ]  2.10 /etc/login.access
          + [   ]  2.11 /etc/login.conf
          + [   ]  2.12 /etc/login.defs
          + [   ]  2.13 PAM
          + [   ]  2.14 cron
          + [   ]  2.15 Secure Terminals
          + [   ]  2.16 RPC
               o [   ]  2.16.1 portmapper/rpcbind
          + [   ]  2.17 Trivial FTP (tftp)
          + [   ]  2.18 majordomo
          + [   ]  2.19 UUCP
          + [   ]  2.20 REXD
     * [   ]  3.0 Network Administration
          + [   ]  3.1 Packet Filtering
          + [   ]  3.2 Denial of Service Attacks
          + [   ]  3.3 Encryption and Strong Authentication
     * [   ]  4.0 File System Security
          + [   ]  4.1 General
          + [   ]  4.2 Startup and Shutdown Scripts
          + [   ]  4.3 External File Systems/Devices
          + [   ]  4.4 File Permissions 
          + [   ]  4.5 Files Run by root
          + [   ]  4.6 Bin Ownership
          + [   ]  4.7 Tiger
          + [   ]  4.8 Tripwire
          + [   ]  4.9 The Coroner's Toolkit
     * [   ]  5.0 Account security
          + [   ]  5.1 Policy
          + [   ]  5.2 Administration
          + [   ]  5.3 Special accounts
          + [   ]  5.4 root Account
          + [   ]  5.5 .netrc Files
          + [   ]  5.6 GCOS Field
          + [   ]  5.7 Authentication
               o [   ]  5.7.1 NIS, NIS+ and /etc/passwd Entries
               o [   ]  5.7.2 Password Shadowing 
               o [   ]  5.7.3 One-Time-Passwords
               o [   ]  5.7.4 LDAP
     * [   ]  6.0 System Monitoring
          + [   ]  6.1 Account Security
          + [   ]  6.2 Log Files
          + [   ]  6.3 Network Security (syslog, etc)

Section III. Major Services

     * [   ]  7.0 Name Service
          + [   ]  7.1 BIND
          + [   ]  7.2 Alternatives
               o [   ]  7.2.1 DNS Tools by D. J. Bernstein
     * [   ]  8.0 Electronic Mail
          + [   ]  8.1 Sendmail
               o [   ]  8.1.1 /etc/aliases
          + [   ]  8.2 Alternatives (qmail and postfix)
               o [   ]  8.2.1 qmail by D. J. Bernstein
               o [   ]  8.2.2 postfix by Wietse Venema (uses an alias
                 database)
          + [   ]  8.3 POP/IMAP
     * [   ]  9.0 Web Security
          + [   ]  9.1 General Configuration
               o [   ]  9.1.1 chroot
               o [   ]  9.1.2 CGI Programming
               o [   ]  9.1.3 daemon non-root uid
               o [   ]  9.1.4 Command Interpreters
               o [   ]  9.1.5 SSL
               o [   ]  9.1.6 Additional Configuration Matters
          + [   ]  9.2 Freely Available Servers
               o [   ]  9.2.1 Apache
               o [   ]  9.2.2 publicfile
               o [   ]  9.2.3 WU-FTPD
          + [   ]  9.3 Client Configuration 
     * [   ]  10.0 FTP: ftpd and anonymous ftp
          + [   ]  10.1 General Server Configuration
          + [   ]  10.2 Incoming Directories
          + [   ]  10.3 Freely Available Servers
          + [   ]  10.4 Anonymous FTP Only
     * [   ]  11.0 File Services
          + [   ]  11.1 NFS
          + [   ]  11.2 Alternatives
               o [   ]  11.2.1 Samba
               o [   ]  11.2.2 AFS
               o [   ]  11.2.3 DFS
     * [   ]  12.0 X Window System
          + [   ]  12.1 X Security - General
          + [   ]  12.2 Problems with xdm

Section IV. Specific Operating Systems

     * [   ]  13.0 BSD-derived Operating Systems
          + [   ]  13.1 BSD/OS
               o [   ]  13.1.1 Patches
               o [   ]  13.1.2 Security Advisories
          + [   ]  13.2 FreeBSD
               o [   ]  13.2.1 Patches
               o [   ]  13.2.2 Security Advisories
          + [   ]  13.3 NetBSD
               o [   ]  13.3.1 Patches
               o [   ]  13.3.2 Security Advisories
          + [   ]  13.4 OpenBSD
               o [   ]  13.4.1 Patches
               o [   ]  13.4.2 Security Advisories
     * [   ]  14.0 Linux Distributions
          + [   ]  14.1 Caldera OpenLinux
               o [   ]  14.1.1 Patches
               o [   ]  14.1.2 Security Advisories
          + [   ]  14.2 Debian GNU/Linux
          + [   ]  14.3 Mandrake Linux
               o [   ]  14.3.1 Patches
               o [   ]  14.3.2 Security Configuration Scripts
          + [   ]  14.4 Redhat Linux
               o [   ]  14.4.1 Patches
               o [   ]  14.4.2 Security Configuration Scripts
          + [   ]  14.5 Slackware Linux
               o [   ]  14.5.1 Patches
               o [   ]  14.5.2 Security Advisories
               o [   ]  14.5.3 Security Configuration Scripts
          + [   ]  14.6 SuSE Linux
          + [   ]  14.7 TurboLinux
          + [   ]  14.8 Others
     * [   ]  15.0 Solaris
          + [   ]  15.1 Patches
          + [   ]  15.2 IP Forwarding and Source Routing
          + [   ]  15.3 Stack Execution
          + [   ]  15.4 NFS Port Monitoring
          + [   ]  15.5 Framebuffers /dev/fbs
          + [   ]  15.6 Security Bulletins
          + [   ]  15.7 Sun BluePrints
          + [   ]  15.8 Solaris Security Toolkit (JASS)
     * [   ]  16.0 IRIX
          + [   ]  16.1 Patches
          + [   ]  16.2 Default Account Security
          + [   ]  16.3 Security Bulletins
     * [   ]  17.0 HP-UX
          + [   ]  17.1 Patches
     * [   ]  18.0 Digital/Compaq Tru64 Unix
          + [   ]  18.1 Patches
     * [   ]  19.0 AIX
          + [   ]  19.1 Patches
          + [   ]  19.2 Security Advisories
   _________________________________________________________________

   Revision History
   Oct 8, 2001
   Initial Release
   _________________________________________________________________

   Questions or comments regarding this page? auscert@auscert.org.au
   Disclaimer - Copyright Đ 2001, AusCERT
   http://www.auscert.org.au/
